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DEMOCRACY AND THE PEOPLE’S ELUSIVE “RIGHT TO 
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 He . . . succeeded thoroughly in making the House understand 
that he was very angry;—but he succeeded in nothing else. . . .  He 
                                                          
Copyright © 2012 by Barry Sullivan. 
∗ Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy and Professor of Law, Loyola University Chica-
go; Fulbright Canada Visiting Research Chair in Legal Studies, University of Alberta, Fall 
2011; Visitor, Law and Public Affairs Program, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and In-
ternational Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2011.  The author is grateful to Randall P. 
Bezanson, Murray Dry, Mark Grunewald, Stanley N. Katz, Alfred S. Konefsky, Matthew 
Lewans, Janet McLean, Robert M. O’Neil, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, and Michael Zimmer 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Allison Creekmur, Anthony Ivone, and 
Hyeng Kim for excellent research assistance.  The author also wishes to acknowledge the 
support of Dean David Yellen, the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Faculty Re-
search Fund, the Cooney & Conway Chair Fund, and Fulbright Canada.  In addition, he 
would like to thank Dean Philip Bryden, Vice-Dean John M. Law, and the faculty and staff 
of the University of Alberta Faculty of Law, Patricia Paradis of the University of Alberta 
Centre for Constitutional Studies, Rev. Edward Kennedy, C.Ss.R., of Ligouri House, Ed-
monton, and Kim Lane Scheppele and Leslie E. Gerwin of the Woodrow Wilson School, 
for their hospitality and support. An earlier version of this essay was presented as the Al-
berta Fulbright Lecture in American Studies at the University of Alberta in November 
2011. 
  
2 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
could not explain his idea that the people out of the House had as 
much right to express their opinion in favour of the ballot as mem-
bers in the House had to express theirs against it . . . .1 
 
“The only person in Washington who cares less about his public im-
age than David Addington is Dick Cheney,” said a former White 
House ally.  “What both of them miss is that . . . in times of war, a 
prerequisite for success is people having confidence in their leader-
ship.  This is the great failure of the administration—a complete 
and total indifference to public opinion.”2 
 
 [Justice] Sotomayor compared the issue [of Wikileaks’ publication 
of the “War Logs”] with the debate over allowing publication of the 
Pentagon Papers . . . .  
 “That was not the beginning of that question, but an issue that 
keeps arising from generation to generation, of how far we will per-
mit government restriction on freedom of speech in favor of protection 
of the country,” Sotomayor said. “There’s no black-and-white line.”3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Do the citizens of a representative democracy have a “right to 
know”?  What is the basis for asserting the existence of such a right?  If 
citizens do have such a right, what is its purpose?  What does it entail, 
and what are its limits?  To what extent, if any, does it entail an obliga-
tion on the part of the government to remove barriers to the flow of 
information or to provide citizens with information within the gov-
ernment’s control?  To what extent should the government’s reasons 
for nondisclosure be subject to scrutiny, and by whom?  How should 
the “right to know” be enforced or given effect? 
Some answers to these questions can be found in positive law: 
what the specific provisions of a particular constitution, laws, judicial 
decisions, and international obligations of a particular state require it 
                                                          
 1.  ANTHONY TROLLOPE, PHINEAS FINN, THE IRISH MEMBER 277 (Penguin Books 
1977) (1869). 
 2.  Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power, WASH. POST 
(June 25, 2007), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing_the_ 
enevelope_on_presi/. 
 3.  David Batty, WikiLeaks War Logs Posting ‘Will Lead to Free Speech Ruling’, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/aug/27/wikileaks-war-logs-free-
speech-supreme-court. 
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to do or refrain from doing with respect to citizen access to infor-
mation.  But answers to these questions also depend on a particular 
culture’s broader understandings of citizenship and of the citizen’s 
proper role in a representative democracy—understandings that may 
or may not be fully or consistently reflected in such formal sources of 
law. 
One understanding of citizenship limits the role of citizens “to 
obey[ing] law and perhaps, in periodic elections, to confirm[ing] the 
choice of leaders whose election gives them the power to enact into 
law whatever policies they see fit.”4  Some of the American founders 
undoubtedly held this view as a normative matter.5  Moreover, since 
World War II, this view has come to represent the lived reality of citi-
zenship for many in the United States and in other representative 
democracies.  Many citizens feel far removed from the workings of 
government and from the decisions that government makes on their 
                                                          
 4.  See ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY: LEGAL THEORY IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 149 (1st ed. 1995) (describing Max Weber’s understanding of bureaucratic 
citizenship).  In a memorial to Vaclav Havel, Paul Wilson recently contrasted Havel’s view 
of citizenship with that of his rival, Vaclav Klaus: 
Freedom, in Klaus’s view, was something bestowed upon the people by their gov-
ernors and guaranteed by their elected representatives.  Citizenship meant vot-
ing once every four years and then leaving civic and economic matters for gov-
ernment and the marketplace to sort out.  It was a view that to many, including 
Havel, seemed suspiciously like the old centrist regime dressed up in new, mar-
ket-minded, quasi-populist rhetoric. 
Paul Wilson, Vaclav Havel (1936-2011), N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/feb/09/vaclav-havel-1936-
2011/?pagination=false.  In recent years, some scholars have even suggested that voting 
cannot be rationally justified because the costs of voting generally exceed the benefits of 
voting, there being little likelihood, if any, that any single vote will affect the outcome of a 
race.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 22–27 (1991) (examining different theories of voting behavior).  But see 
Aaron Edlin et al., Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-
Being of Others, 19 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 293, 293–94 (2007) (arguing that voting is a ra-
tional activity even in large elections if voters have social preferences and are concerned 
about social welfare because, even though the probability of a single vote making a differ-
ence may be slight, the social benefits at stake in the election are large). 
 5.  See RICHARD BROOKHISER, JAMES MADISON 9 (2011) (“[I]n the early 1790s, regular-
ly consulting public opinion was a new concept.  Many of Madison’s colleagues, including 
Washington and Hamilton, had little use for it.”). 
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behalf.6  Indeed, the emergence and consolidation of the national se-
curity state, especially as reflected in the events of the past decade, has 
                                                          
 6.  In the United States, for example, World War II and the Cold War gave birth to 
the “National Security State,” in which even top government officials were sometimes de-
nied access to important information.  See generally GARY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE 
MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (2010); John Gorham Palfrey, 
The Problem of Secrecy, 290 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 90 (1953); see also Steve Coll, 
Our Secret American Security State, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2012.  As a practical matter, the 
executive branch often has superior (if not always exclusive) access to massive amounts of 
information, and it has great discretion to decide whether to withhold or disclose that in-
formation.  The executive sometimes chooses, for its purposes, to classify information and 
then selectively disclose some of the information that has been classified.  See, e.g., Scott 
Shane, Renewing a Debate over Secrecy, and its Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1 (discuss-
ing the government’s selective disclosure of information regarding covert drone attacks in 
Pakistan).  Such practices create serious anomalies, to say the least.  See id. (“‘There’s 
something wrong with [an administration’s] aggressive leaking and winking and nodding 
about the drone program, but saying in response to Freedom of Information requests that 
they can’t comment because the program is covert,’ [Harvard Law School professor and 
George W. Bush Administration official Jack] Goldsmith said.”).  In addition to simply 
withholding information, or disseminating it on a selective basis, the executive has often 
provided the people and their representatives with information that was false or mislead-
ing.  See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE: THE TRUTH ABOUT LYING IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 46–55 (2011) (describing instances in which the executive 
branch disseminated false or misleading information to advance its goals in World War II, 
the Vietnam War, and the war in Iraq).  In those ways, the executive can use its infor-
mation monopoly to direct and control public opinion, at least for the short term.  Id.  
Groups in many countries have sought to overcome this condition by pressing for the 
adoption of access-to-information laws.  See, e.g., PATRICK BIRKINSHAW, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION: THE LAW, THE PRACTICE, AND THE IDEAL 458–95 (4th ed. 2010) (collecting 
access-to-information statutes from common-law jurisdictions).  Unnecessary secrecy not 
only distorts public debate, but may also lead to alienation and distrust of government, 
which is exacerbated when many already believe that politicians are overly dependent on 
(and responsive to) special interest groups, especially those with access to large concentra-
tions of surplus wealth.  As Justice Stevens wrote in dissent in Citizens United v. FEC, “[a] 
democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being 
bought and sold.”  130 S. Ct. 876, 964 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see also id. at 963 n.64 (“The majority declares by fiat that the appearance of 
undue influence by high-spending corporations ‘will not cause the electorate to lose faith 
in our democracy.’  The electorate itself has consistently indicated otherwise, both in opin-
ion polls and in the laws its representatives have passed, and our colleagues have no basis 
for elevating their own optimism into a tenet of constitutional law.” (citations omitted)). 
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created substantial distinctions in status and authority even among 
leaders and has generally diminished the status and authority of the 
legislative branch.7 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the view taken by James 
Madison in the early 1790s, namely, that citizens should be “consulted 
between elections continually,” and treated as “partners in govern-
ment,”8 even when the immediate responsibility for decision-making 
                                                          
 7.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (noting the “enormous power [of the executive] in the related areas of national de-
fense and international relations,” which has been “pressed to the very hilt since the ad-
vent of the nuclear missile age”); see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 209 (2010) (arguing that “it is 
pointless to bewail” the fact that “[t]he center of gravity has shifted to the executive, which 
both makes policy and administers it, subject to weak constraints imposed by Congress, the 
judiciary, and the states,” and “futile to argue that Madisonian structures should be rein-
vigorated”); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 55, 175 (2009) [hereinafter SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE] (argu-
ing that “a presidency unfettered by congressional accountability and judicial oversight” 
does not “actually serve the public interest better than a concededly robust presidency . . . 
subject to meaningful checks and balances,” and further arguing that “[t]he most danger-
ous of the threats to checks and balances have appeared when the aggressive, norm-
breaching tendencies of the Republican Right have joined with a trend toward increased 
executive power that has been notable since the New Deal”); Barry Sullivan, The Irish Con-
stitution: Some Reflections From Abroad, in THE IRISH CONSTITUTION: GOVERNANCE AND 
VALUES 27–32 (Oran Doyle & Eoin Carolan eds., 2008) (discussing the challenges of exec-
utive accountability and effectiveness); Rodney Austin, Freedom of Information: The Constitu-
tional Impact, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 334–35 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver, 
eds., 1985) (discussing the irony that parliamentary power to extract information from the 
executive in England declined just as the role of government and the volume of official 
information both increased). 
 8.  BROOKHISER, supra note 5, at 103, 107; J.R. POLE, THE GIFT OF GOVERNMENT: 
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE ENGLISH RESTORATION TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 
140 (1983) (“Neither political representation nor popular government was a new idea at 
the time of the American Revolution.  What was new in the politics of the time was the use 
of representation as a clearly defined institutional bridge between people and govern-
ment.  The two-way traffic over this bridge was a traffic in knowledge.  The men who de-
vised the Constitution and the men who wrote the Federalist Papers had not anticipated that 
the principle of accountability would assume forms that would subject it to such intimate, 
yet public, investigation and control.  A politics of trust was replaced by a politics of vigi-
lance. . . .  Only through knowledge of the government of America could the people con-
fide to it their confidence and trust.”); Hitherto Unpublished Correspondence Between Chief Jus-
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rests with the people’s representatives, rather than with the people 
themselves.9  As a theoretical matter, Madison’s view could command 
widespread adherence today.  Reality may be quite different.  The ex-
tent to which government recognizes the right of access to infor-
mation depends on society’s view of citizenship and on the strength of 
its commitment to that view. 
The problem of access to information arises in various forms.  
One concerns the extent of the government’s authority to impose re-
strictions on an audience’s right to hear what a willing speaker wishes 
to communicate.10  Another concerns the extent of the government’s 
authority to restrict the secondary distribution of government infor-
mation by a willing speaker who has acquired the information without 
                                                          
tice Cushing and John Adams in 1789, 28 MASS. L.Q., Oct. 1942, at 16 (“Our chief magistrates 
and Senators are annually eligible by the people.  How are their characters and conduct to 
be known to their constituents but by the press?  If the press is to be stopped and the peo-
ple kept in ignorance we had much better have [those offices] hereditary.  I therefore, am 
very clear that . . . it would be safest to admit evidence to the jury of the Truth of accusa-
tions, and if the jury found them true and that they were published for the Public good, 
they would readily acquit.”) (letter from John Adams to William Cushing dated March 7, 
1789). 
 9.  See also GORDON S. WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28–29 
(rev. ed. 2008) (“Since actual representation was based on the people’s mistrust of those 
they elected, Americans tended to push for the most explicit and broadest kind of consent, 
which generally meant voting.  The mutuality of interests that made virtual representation 
meaningful in England was in America so weak and tenuous that the representatives could 
not be trusted to speak for the interests of their constituents unless they actually voted for 
them.”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976) (upholding the First Amendment rights of consumers to receive commer-
cial information, while recognizing that some state regulation of commercial speech is 
permissible); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (upholding the Attorney 
General’s exclusion from the United States of a Marxist scholar invited to attend an aca-
demic conference and present university lectures, but acknowledging that citizens have a 
First Amendment right to receive non-commercial information).  The extent to which the 
Court has increased protection for commercial speech in recent years is well demonstrated 
by Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., in which the Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny to 
strike down, on  First Amendment grounds, a Vermont statute that restricted the sale, dis-
closure, and use of retail pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing practices of indi-
vidual physicians and were therefore commercially valuable to pharmaceutical companies 
in their marketing efforts.  131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011). 
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the government’s consent.11  A third involves the extent of the gov-
ernment’s affirmative obligation to provide the public with infor-
mation that either relates to the activities and conduct of government 
or bears on important questions of public policy, but which the gov-
ernment—or individual government officials with control over the in-
formation—would like to keep secret.12 
Government officials keep secrets for a variety of reasons, to vary-
ing degrees, for varying periods of time, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, and with varying degrees of public awareness that secrets are be-
ing kept.  Sometimes government officials keep secrets from the 
general public; sometimes they keep secrets from all but a small circle 
of officials or other confidants.  Sometimes they keep secrets because 
they believe, rightly or not, that secrecy will promote the public inter-
est.  Sometimes they do so for political advantage or to hide their own 
mistakes or crimes.  Sometimes they do so mindlessly or because of 
bureaucratic habit.  Sometimes they do so simply to conserve scarce 
resources. Sometimes the government will have a monopoly over rele-
vant information.  Sometimes the information will be available from 
other sources.13  In any event, governments create or control vast 
                                                          
 11.  See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam) (addressing the question whether 
certain newspapers could be enjoined from publishing classified materials that were given 
to them by a third party who was authorized to have custody of the materials, but was not 
authorized to disseminate them). 
 12.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 
604–05, 610–11 (1982) (holding that a Massachusetts statute that permitted the exclusion 
of the public and the press from criminal trials involving juvenile victims of certain sex 
crimes violated the First Amendment because the historic right of access to criminal trials 
ensured that the constitutionally protected right to discuss governmental affairs “is an in-
formed one”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586–87 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining the constitutional right to attend criminal trials in 
terms of the right of access to government information, which plays a structural role in 
securing “our republican system of self-government”). 
 13.  Of course, the government’s dominion over information is neither absolute nor 
permanent.  Sometimes other sources exist; sometimes some officials have an incentive to 
disclose information when others wish to withhold it.  The government probably cannot 
succeed in keeping information secret indefinitely, but it may be able to do so until the 
need for that information has passed.  When the government has a monopoly, even tem-
porarily, on information relating to the most important matters affecting the public wel-
fare—questions of war and peace, significant threats to the national economy or the public 
order, or massive and possibly cataclysmic environmental damage—the consequences of 
withholding it from the public can be extremely serious.  See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING 
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amounts of information.  In the United States, many government offi-
cials are authorized to classify information, and a great deal of gov-
ernment information is classified.14  Much more government infor-
mation is not actually classified but is thought by government officials 
to be “sensitive” for one reason or another, and it is therefore deemed 
to be inappropriate for dissemination to the public.  Thus, for exam-
ple, government officials intent on avoiding disclosure often give cre-
ative interpretations to laws that permit—but do not require—the 
withholding of government information.15  While secrecy may some-
                                                          
POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 13 (2003) (noting that 
individuals have a right to hold the government accountable for “extensive coercive pow-
ers which can adversely affect the interests of its citizens”); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 257, 286 (2010) (explaining that government “secrecy reduces the ability of 
the people and their representatives to monitor [government] activities and to identify 
and debate relevant issues in an informed manner”). 
 14.  See generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21900, THE PROTECTION 
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2011) (briefly detailing the history 
of classification and the legal framework under which it currently operates in the United 
States).  Several recent studies have called attention to the problem of overclassification.  
See, e.g., MIKE GERMAN & JAY STANLEY, ACLU, DRASTIC MEASURES REQUIRED: CONGRESS 
NEEDS TO OVERHAUL U.S. SECRECY LAWS AND INCREASE OVERSIGHT OF THE SECRET 
SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT 5–7 (July 2011) (concluding that the federal government en-
gages in excessive government secrecy); ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 
4–6 (2011) (discussing the over-classification of documents that pose no threat to national 
security). 
 15.  For example, the exemptions set forth in the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) are generally framed in permissive rather than mandatory terms, but have some-
times been construed by administrators to justify virtually automatic withholding.  See infra 
Part IV.  Administrators who wish to avoid disclosure have an arsenal of weapons at their 
disposal.  Simple delay is one; putting requesters through the expense and inconvenience 
of having to invoke further administrative and judicial remedies is another.  See Matthew L. 
Wald, Slow Responses Cloud a Window into Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, at A17 (dis-
cussing the non-compliance of various federal agencies with the mandates of FOIA).  Stu-
dents of administrative behavior have long recognized that “the most awesome discretion-
ary power is the omnipresent power to do nothing.”  Kenneth F. Warren, Administrative 
Discretion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 35, 36 (Jack 
Rabin ed., 2003). 
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times be necessary to the work of government, secrecy in a democratic 
society always comes at a price.16 
Legal recognition of the people’s “right to know” serves two sep-
arate democratic values: governmental accountability and citizen par-
ticipation.17  In some countries, largely because of developments in 
constitutional theory and human rights law since World War II, an in-
dividually enforceable “right to know” has been recognized explicitly 
in constitutional texts and jurisprudence.18  That is true with respect 
to certain international rights instruments as well.  In addition, statu-
tory rights of access to information have been enacted in many coun-
                                                          
 16.  Some degree of secrecy will always be necessary because no government can func-
tion entirely in the round.  Thus, the basic question in this area is whether secrecy or dis-
closure should provide the default rule and, in either case, what showing should be re-
quired to overcome the presumption created by the default rule.  Almost fifty years ago, 
Donald C. Rowat, a Canadian political scientist, urged us to “face the fact that any large 
measure of governmental secrecy is incompatible with democracy.”  Donald C. Rowat, The 
Problem of Administrative Secrecy, 32 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 99, 100 (1966).  Rowat pointed 
out that, “[t]he principle followed almost everywhere [has been] that all administrative 
activities and documents shall be secret unless and until the Government chooses to reveal 
them.  The public has no right to know the manner in which the Government is carrying 
out its trust.”  Id. at 99.  For a long time after the emergence of representative democracy, 
little attention was paid to the problem of secrecy or to the “right” of the people to know 
what their government was doing.  That was the case, Rowat suggested, because few ques-
tioned the strong tradition of discretionary secrecy that developed in the age of absolute 
monarchies and was passed on, almost imperceptibly, to the popular governments that 
took their place.  Donald C. Rowat, How Much Administrative Secrecy?, 31 CAN. J. ECON. & 
POL. SCI. 479, 491 (1965); Donald C. Rowat, The Right to Government Information in Democra-
cies, 48 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 59, 59 (1982).  The theoretical basis for state sovereignty 
and legitimacy may have changed, but important state practices have not. 
 17.  The literature on accountability and participation is voluminous.  See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“Speech is an essential mechanism of democra-
cy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” (citations omitted)); 
Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005) (arguing that governmental accountability is “one of sev-
eral ways in which power can be constrained”); see also Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and 
Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron, 22 LAW. & PHIL. 451, 482–83 (2003) (arguing that 
participation value does not displace “instrumental condition of good government”); Jer-
emy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1361 (2006) 
(arguing for priority of participation value in democratic government). 
 18.  TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 20–21, 
43–126 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/comparative.pdf. 
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tries.19  Most important, though, some foreign and international 
courts have understood the people’s “right to know” to entail an af-
firmative governmental duty to remove barriers to the free flow of in-
formation and, in some circumstances, to provide the public with ac-
cess to information within the government’s control.20 
In the post-war years, but particularly during the 1960s and the 
1970s, some scholars and litigants in the United States pressed the 
Supreme Court to give a broad interpretation to the First Amend-
ment, and thus situate a similar right of access to government infor-
mation within the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of 
speech,21 just as the Court had discerned an implicit constitutional 
                                                          
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See, e.g., Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, No. 37374/05, at 10 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 2009) [hereinafter HCLU v. Hungary], available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-92171 (concluding that the government, in some cases, has 
an affirmative duty to remove obstacles that hinder the ability of citizens to access infor-
mation of public interest); Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 151, ¶¶ 163, 174 (Sept. 19, 2006) [hereinafter 
Claude-Reyes] (finding an affirmative governmental obligation to provide information to 
the public). 
 21.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25, 88 (1948) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] (“What is essential 
[to freedom of speech] is . . . that everything worth saying shall be said,” so that “every vot-
ing member of the body politic [has] the fullest possible participation in the understand-
ing of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal”); 
Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (“It is 
clear . . . that the right to know fits readily into the [F]irst [A]mendment and the whole 
system of freedom of expression.”); Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment 
Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461, 471-72, 479 (1953) [hereinafter Meiklejohn, Mean?] (not-
ing that the First Amendment protects political freedom, and that the “progress of politi-
cal freedom gives better assurance of national security than does any program of political 
repression and enslavement”).  Meiklejohn also wrote: 
[T]he people need free speech because they have decided, in adopting, main-
taining and interpreting their Constitution, to govern themselves rather than to 
be governed by others.  And, in order to make that self-government a reality ra-
ther than an illusion, in order that it may become as wise and efficient as its re-
sponsibilities may require, the judgment-making of the people must be self-
educated in the ways of freedom.  That is, I think, the positive purpose to which 
the negative words of the First Amendment gave a constitutional expression.  
Moreover, . . . I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas 
and paintings and poems, because they will be called upon to vote. 
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right to freedom of association during that period.22  Some argued 
that the First Amendment is centrally concerned with accountability 
and meaningful participation in self-government, and that such a 
right is therefore implicit in the First Amendment.23  Others opposed 
recognition of such a right on the grounds that it was both unneces-
sary and contrary to the limited role contemplated for citizens in a 
representative democracy.24  Some acknowledged the public’s “right 
to know” as an important constitutional value, but found no basis for 
inferring an individually actionable legal right predicated on that val-
ue.25  Finally, some interposed practical objections because they be-
                                                          
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 
[hereinafter Meiklejohn, Absolute] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate that 
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an insepara-
ble aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which embraces freedom of speech.” (citations omitted)).  The Court would later 
emphasize that the freedom of association “‘plainly presupposes a freedom not to associ-
ate.’”  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).  Significantly, opposition to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), as well as to the mandates contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (2006), were often framed in terms of freedom of association.  See, 
e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 
(1959) (“But if the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an 
association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.  Is this not the heart of the 
issue involved, a conflict in human claims of high dimension, not unlike many others that 
involve the highest freedoms . . . ?”). 
 23.  See supra note 21. 
 24.  See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a 
Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 503–05 (1980) (arguing that the role of citi-
zens in a representative democracy is much more attenuated than that described by Mei-
klejohn, and that public issues generally are decided, not by the people themselves, but by 
the representatives the people elect to make those decisions for them); Louis Henkin, The 
Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 
273 (1971) (“A ‘right of the people to know’ may indeed have been a principal rationale 
for the freedom of the Press, but, in the law at least, the people’s right to know was deriva-
tive, the obverse of the right of the Press to publish, and coextensive with it.”); Edward H. 
Levi, Confidentiality and Democratic Government, 30 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 323, 326 (1975) 
(discussing both sides of the debate). 
 25.  See, e.g., David M. O’Brien, The First Amendment and the Public’s “Right to Know,” 7 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 588–89 (1980) (acknowledging the public’s right to know as 
an “abstract right”). 
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lieved that the administration of such a right would present problems 
that were intractable, inherently political, and beyond the compe-
tence of the judiciary.26  The practical objections were serious, but the 
climate of opinion and the general trend of constitutional law also 
were unfavorable for the recognition of a general, individually en-
forceable, constitutional right.27 
                                                          
 26.  See BeVier, supra note 24, at 507–10; Henkin, supra note 24, at 278–80. 
 27.  To understand the climate of opinion, one must begin with Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, which recently has been recognized as an “icon” of American constitutional law.  
Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S 
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 1 (Jack Balkin ed., 2001).  Initial reaction to the deci-
sion, however, was mixed at best.  Southern politicians, not unexpectedly, reacted angrily 
to Brown.  See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 752 (1976) (describing the so-
called “Southern Manifesto,” a condemnation of Brown issued by 101 Southern Congress-
men and Senators, including all but three of the Senators who represented the states of 
the “old Confederacy”). Mainstream legal scholars, many of whom found segregation to be 
morally repugnant, also questioned the Court’s use of its power and the legitimacy of its 
reasoning.  See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958) (criticizing the de-
cision as “wrong” and an illegitimate “coup de main”); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157–58 (1955) (criticizing the Court’s reliance on social science re-
search); Wechsler, supra note 22, at 22–23, 31–34 (criticizing the Court’s failure to articu-
late a neutral principle, and its failure to justify the later extension of its holding to cases 
outside the area of education).  Alexander Bickel brilliantly defended the decision, but his 
coining of the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” set the stage for further criti-
cism of the legitimacy of judicial review.  See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23, 245 (1962) 
(“[A]nnouncement of the principle in the School Segregation Cases was in itself an action of 
great moment . . . .”).  Later decisions of the Warren Court in a broad range of areas, alt-
hough frequently accepted without question today, also proved controversial at the time.  
See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 3 
(1979) (“The Warren Court had often plunged the country into bitter controversy as it 
decreed an end to publicly supported racial discrimination, banned prayer in the public 
schools, and extended constitutional guarantees to blacks, poor people, those who were 
questioned, arrested or charged by the police.”).  Justice Rehnquist, who served as one of 
Justice Jackson’s law clerks while Brown was pending, prepared a predecisional memoran-
dum to Justice Jackson opposing the outcome in Brown; as early as 1955, Rehnquist had 
begun denouncing the opinion to third parties.  Brad Snyder & John Q. Barrett, 
Rehnquist’s Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk’s 1955 Thoughts on Justice Jackson and Brown, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 631, 647–48 (2012) (“Rehnquist’s 1955 letter to Frankfurter . . . began a pat-
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tern of hostility to the Warren Court’s individual rights agenda . . . .”).  Many of the 
Court’s controversial decisions were rooted, as Charles R. Epp has noted, in law that had 
been developed long before Chief Justice Warren’s appointment to the Court: “The War-
ren Court’s reputation for creative judicial leadership is well deserved. Nonetheless, at 
least half of the total growth in judicial attention to the new rights that eventually occurred 
between 1917 and the mid-sixties . . . had already occurred by the time Earl Warren joined 
the Court.”  CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND SUPREME 
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39 (1998).  Nonetheless, opposition to the deci-
sions of the Warren Court, and the “activism” those opinions were thought to represent, 
became an important feature of the political landscape.  See Archibald Cox, The Role of the 
Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1967) (“It is the character of 
the Court’s business which catches it up in public debate and makes individual justices the 
subjects of bitter criticism.  This is nothing new. John Marshall was reviled in terms more 
virulent than even the present Chief Justice.”).  In 1968, one theme of Richard Nixon’s 
campaign for the presidency was that the decisions of the Warren Court had simply “gone 
too far.”  Jesse H. Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Restraint and 
Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 767, 767 (1979).  Academic concern 
with “judicial activism” also gave rise to new schools of legal scholarship, which included 
such figures as Robert Bork, who insisted on the primacy of “originalism” in constitutional 
interpretation. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 4–9 (1971) (advocating originalist interpretative approach and criticizing 
the Warren Court’s lack of principled decision-making in cases such as Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1968), which he compared to “a miracle of transubstantiation”).  If any-
thing, criticism of the Court intensified following the Chief Justice’s retirement because of 
controversies over court-ordered busing and as a result of the Burger Court’s decision in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See Barry Sullivan, Constitutional Interpretation and Republi-
can Government, 28 DUBLIN U. L.J. 221, 225–28 (2006) (describing the growing conservative 
frustration with the Supreme Court occasioned by Roe v. Wade and the political use made 
of that frustration).  Between 1969 and 1981, three Republican presidents appointed six 
members of the Court (Justices Burger, Blackmun, O’Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens), while Jimmy Carter, the only Democratic president during that period, had no occa-
sion to appoint a single justice to the Court.  Many observers expected the Burger Court to 
stage a “counterrevolution” in constitutional law.  As Mark Tushnet observed in 1984, 
however, the counter-revolution did not occur as scheduled.  Mark Tushnet, The Optimist’s 
Tale, 132 U. PA. L. REV. l257, 1257 (1984) (reviewing THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)).  What actually happened may be 
open to dispute, but two points may be made with some degree of confidence: (1) there 
was no wholesale repudiation of Warren Court jurisprudence, and (2) there was little ap-
petite for boldly expanding that jurisprudence.  As Kenneth Karst has recently argued, 
however, six Republican appointees (Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, O’Connor, Powell, 
Souter, and Stevens) “act[ed] to save rights of inclusion from serious threats of abandon-
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In the end, the Court gave effect to some aspects of the “right to 
know,” but rejected the idea that the United States Constitution cre-
ates any general, legally enforceable obligation on the part of gov-
ernment to provide information to the public.  In 1971, in New York 
Times Co. v. United States,28 the Court held, on First Amendment 
grounds, that the federal courts could not enjoin the New York Times 
and the Washington Post from publishing classified government docu-
ments concerning the history of United States involvement in Vi-
etnam that had come into their possession.29  Then, in 1972, in 
Kleindienst v. Mandel,30 the Court upheld the U.S. Attorney General’s 
broad discretion to exclude aliens from the United States, but 
acknowledged that the First Amendment prevents the government 
from unreasonably interfering with a willing speaker’s communica-
tion with a willing audience in a non-commercial context.31  Four 
years later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,32 the Court upheld the First Amendment right of 
consumers to receive commercial communications from willing 
speakers.33  The Court said: “Freedom of speech presupposes a willing 
                                                          
ment or radical restriction.”  Kenneth L. Karst, Through Streets Broad and Narrow: Six “Cen-
trist” Justices on the Path to Inclusion, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 32.  If the development of the law 
generally depends, as Justice Cardozo suggested, on two countervailing forces—“[t]he 
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic,” on the one hand, and the 
tendency of a principle “to confine itself within the limits of its history,” on the other 
hand, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (30th prtg. 1971) 
(1921), the climate of opinion in the late 1970s and the early 1980s generally favored the 
latter force.  O’Brien’s analysis strongly reflects that trend.  O’Brien, supra note 25. 
 28.  403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
 29.  Id. at 714; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) 
(“[T]ruthful information sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired.”).  In 
dissent, Justice Souter noted that “freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value 
of enhancing . . . discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more pru-
dently self-governed” and that “‘[w]ithout the information provided by the press most of 
us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register 
opinions on the administration of government generally.’”  Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted). 
 30.  408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 31.  Id. at 769–70. 
 32.  425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 33.  Id. at 773. 
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speaker.  But where a speaker exists . . . the protection afforded is to 
the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”34 
In 1978, however, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,35 the Court rejected 
the idea that the public or the press has an individually enforceable 
First Amendment right of access to government information.36  In do-
ing so, the Court approved the government’s decision to deny a 
broadcasting company access to a jail where the conditions of con-
finement had been held to violate the Eighth Amendment.  Justice 
Stewart, who provided the critical vote in that four-to-three decision, 
stated unequivocally that the Constitution does “not guarantee the 
public a right of access to information generated or controlled by 
government.”37  Access to information in such a case depends entirely 
                                                          
 34.  Id. at 756.  The Court held that prescription drug customers are constitutionally 
entitled, notwithstanding state laws to the contrary, “to receive information that pharma-
cists wish to communicate to them through advertising and other promotional means, 
concerning the prices of such drugs.”  Id. at 754.  In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the 
Court made clear that commercial speech was not “wholly outside the protection of the 
First Amendment,” and that the state may not “completely suppress the dissemination of 
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s 
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.” Id. at 761, 773.  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Stewart underscored that the Court’s phrasing properly recognized the “important 
differences between commercial price and product advertising, on the one hand, and ide-
ological communication on the other.”  Id. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice 
Rehnquist dissented, decrying the Court’s elevation of the “commercial intercourse be-
tween a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the same plane 
as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas.”  Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting).  In subsequent cases, the Court has greatly expanded the protection afford-
ed to commercial speech.  See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (us-
ing heightened scrutiny to strike down, on First Amendment grounds, a Vermont statute 
that prohibited retail pharmacies from selling, without the consent of the prescribing phy-
sician, records that reflected the physician’s individual prescribing patterns, which phar-
maceutical companies found useful in their marketing efforts). 
 35.  438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 36.  Id. at 15–16. 
 37.  Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring); see, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 
(1974) (noting that, once the requirements of prison security have been satisfied, “a pris-
on inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as 
a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system,” but re-
jecting the idea that newspapers had an absolute right to conduct face-to-face interviews 
with prisoners, at least where prisoners had “alternative means of communicat[ing] with 
the press”); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (holding that the prohibi-
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on whether the government is a willing speaker.  Justice Stevens was 
equally forceful in dissent, where he observed: “It is not sufficient . . . 
that the channels of communication be free of governmental re-
straints.  Without some protection for the acquisition of information 
about the operation of public institutions . . . by the public at large, 
the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be 
stripped of its substance.”38 
In sum, the Court’s jurisprudence from that period established 
that the “right to know” precludes the government from enjoining 
publication of classified documents and from unreasonably interfer-
ing with an audience’s right to receive information from a willing 
speaker, but imposes no individually enforceable obligation on the 
part of government to provide members of the public with infor-
mation within the government’s control.  Thereafter, the Court would 
decide a series of cases upholding an individually enforceable right of 
                                                          
tion of face-to-face interviews with prisoners did not abridge the freedom of the press un-
der the First Amendment, at least where the press had alternative means of access to pris-
oners); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1984) (upholding a protective 
order that restricted a newspaper’s use of information gained through pretrial civil discov-
ery in an action in which the newspaper was a party, but allowed the newspaper to publish 
the same information if it could show that it was obtained from another source.”).  One 
commentator has noted that, “restricting the media’s access to the battlefield or to infor-
mation pertaining to ongoing military operations is the most effective and elusive re-
striction on press freedom not yet addressed by the Supreme Court or Congress.”  Karen 
C. Sinai, Note, Shock and Awe: Does the First Amendment Protect a Media Right of Access to Mili-
tary Operations?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 179, 184 (2004).  Supreme Court jurispru-
dence suggests that the Court would view its consideration of that issue to raise serious 
separation of powers issues.  See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) 
(noting that the executive branch is best equipped to determine who should have access to 
sensitive information); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, 111 (1948) (noting that foreign policy decisions are the domain of the executive 
branch, which “has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to 
be published to the world”). 
 38.  Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 860 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“At some point official restraints on access to news sources . . . may 
so undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is . . . necessary to require the 
government to justify such regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary au-
thority and administrative convenience.”); Pell, 417 U.S. at 839–40 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(noting that Judge Gesell, by requiring that the press be given access to inmates, “did not 
vindicate any right of the Washington Post, but rather the right of the people, the true 
sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in an informed manner”). 
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access to judicial proceedings and records,39 but it did not revisit the 
more general question.  In the end, the Court continued to 
acknowledge the “right to know” as a core constitutional value, but 
declined to recognize any general, individually enforceable right of 
access to government information.40 
At least in part, the Court’s failure to revisit Justice Stewart’s con-
clusion in Houchins is attributable to Congress’s enactment of the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA” or “the Act”).41  When Congress 
                                                          
 39.  See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 
15 (1986) (recognizing a First Amendment right to preliminary hearing transcripts); Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984) (recog-
nizing a First Amendment right to attend voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court for the Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1982) (invalidating a statute that 
permitted the exclusion of the public from judicial hearings involving testimony of minor 
victims of sex crimes); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1980) 
(recognizing a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials).  In Gannett Co., Inc. v. De-
Pasquale, the Court upheld the exclusion of the press from a suppression hearing, but the 
continued vitality of that ruling is questionable in light of the foregoing authorities.  443 
U.S. 368, 393 (1979).  But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (holding that 
the First Amendment does not trump a reporter’s obligation to testify in connection with a 
criminal investigation).  The issue of public access to trials also arises in the context of a 
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a fair and public trial.  See Presley v. 
Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2010) (holding that the exclusion of a defendant’s uncle dur-
ing voir dire, notwithstanding the defendant’s objection, violated the defendant’s right to 
a public trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (holding that the closure of a 
suppression hearing over the defendant’s objection violated his right to a public trial).  
The question of access to “special interest” deportation proceedings has been raised re-
cently in the lower federal courts.  See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692–93, 
710 (6th Cir. 2002) (requiring case-by-case decision-making); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding a closed hearings policy). 
 40.  See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 25, at 579 & n.3 (listing Supreme Court cases that re-
jected the “right to know”).  In his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Stevens 
seemingly overestimated the significance of that case.  He wrote that, “[t]his is a watershed 
case. . . .  [F]or the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference 
with access to important information is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of 
the press protected by the First Amendment.”  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582–83 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  In fact, that holding would be given a relatively narrow reach. 
 41.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).  The Freedom of Information Act was signed by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson on July 4, 1966.  President Johnson was notably unenthusiastic about 
the law.  Freedom of Information at 40: LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut Bill with Signing State-
ment, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 194 (July 4, 2006), 
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enacted FOIA in 1966, it acted on the same conviction that animated 
the Houchins dissenters, namely, that access to information is essential 
to citizenship in a representative democracy and that ordinary politi-
cal processes do not necessarily produce an adequate flow of infor-
mation to the people or their representatives.42  The enactment of 
FOIA also shifted the focus of litigation, and thus the focus of the 
Court’s attention, from constitutional to statutory grounds.  The Act 
relieved courts from having to explore some of the difficult questions 
connected with the recognition of a general, individually enforceable 
constitutional “right to know;”43 it also caused courts to focus on nar-
row statutory issues, while overlooking the significance of FOIA’s First 
Amendment foundations and its quasi-constitutional character.44  The 
                                                          
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.htm.  Many state and local 
governments, however, soon enacted similar statutes.  State Freedom of Information Laws, 
NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/state-freedom-of-information-
laws; State Freedom of Information Act Map, PBS (Dec. 12, 2003), 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/foiamap.html.  Other nations did so as well.  See 
BIRKINSHAW, supra note 6, at 480–95 (discussing statutes in common-law jurisdictions).  In 
some countries, such statutes do not stand alone, but supplement constitutional provi-
sions, which may generate greater respect and are often more difficult to amend.  But law 
is part of culture, and the practical difference between statutory and constitutional status 
may be less important in some cultures than in others.  Law may command more or less 
respect for reasons independent of the particular form that law takes. 
 42.  See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32780, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) AMENDMENTS: 110TH CONGRESS 1–3 (2008) (explaining that 
FOIA increased public access to government in light of “‘the people’s right to know’ about 
the activities and operations of government”).  Significantly, the first FOIA case to reach 
the Supreme Court was one brought by thirty-three members of Congress, who had sought 
and been denied access to reports prepared for the president concerning the possible ef-
fects of certain underground nuclear tests that the government planned to conduct in 
Alaska.  EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1973). 
 43.  As previously noted, some commentators opposed recognition of such a right on 
the ground that it would require courts to perform functions that were both theoretically 
and practically beyond their competence.  O’Brien, supra note 25, at 613–14.  Judicial en-
forcement of FOIA is subject to some of the same objections.  The Act did not save the ju-
diciary from the burden of judgment with respect to seemingly intractable issues, and it 
may not have provided courts with much specific guidance for resolving those issues. 
 44.  See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 436 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (“Neither the First Amendment 
nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or 
sources of information within the government’s control.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
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rich conversation about access to information and its connection to 
democratic citizenship was largely eclipsed by FOIA, giving way to 
technical discussions about the Act and its exemptions.  As the FOIA 
case law developed, little more than lip service was paid to FOIA’s 
central purpose, let alone to the need for the three branches of gov-
ernment to respect that purpose in their encounters with FOIA.45  As 
                                                          
& John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1227 (2001) (noting that statutes have 
the potential to shift fundamental, common, and constitutional law alike). 
 45.  Administrations have adopted various interpretations of FOIA.  Some administra-
tions have been more willing than others to approve the withholding of information 
whenever it can be withheld under the Act, rather than requiring officials to determine 
whether information that could be withheld should be withheld.  For example, in 1981, the 
Reagan Administration announced that it would defend any denial that was supported by 
a “substantial legal basis.”  Christopher M. Mason, Comment, Developments Under the Freedom 
of Information Act–1981, 1982 DUKE L.J. 423, 423–25.  In 1982, President Reagan issued an 
executive order that called for increased classification and encouraged agencies to err on 
the side of non-disclosure. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982).  It 
remained in force until 1993, when the Clinton Administration announced a “presump-
tion of disclosure” and agreed to defend withholding only if it was “reasonably fore-
see[able] that disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by [a specific] exemp-
tion.”  Memorandum from Janet Reno, U.S. Att’y Gen. to Heads of All Fed. Dep’ts & 
Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/reno.html.  The di-
rective counseled that items which “might technically or arguably fall within an exemp-
tion . . . ought not to be withheld . . . unless [they] need be.”  Id.  In 2001, the George W. 
Bush Administration directed agencies to consider whether “institutional, commercial, 
and personal privacy interests . . . could be implicated by disclosure,” and promised to de-
fend decisions to withhold “unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted 
risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records.”  
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen. to Heads of All Fed. Dep’ts & Agencies 
(Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm.  The George 
W. Bush Administration “consistently withheld information from members of Congress 
and from investigative bodies, [and] subjected FOIA users to long delays.”  Pozen, supra 
note 13, at 259 (citations omitted).  President Obama, however, promised “an unprece-
dented level of openness.”  See Memorandum from Barack Obama, U.S. President to 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Transparency_and_Open_Government/.  
He also directed the development of a new FOIA policy statement clearly establishing a 
presumption in favor of disclosure.  Memorandum from Barack Obama, U.S. President to 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Freedom_of_Information_Act/.  In March 2009, the Attorney General 
announced that an agency denial would be defended only when withholding was required 
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Justice Scalia observed in John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,46 for exam-
ple, the principle that FOIA’s exemptions should be “‘narrowly con-
strued’” became “a formula to be recited rather than a principle to be 
followed.”47 
One commentator has noted that “a presumption in favour of 
disclosure as a fundamental right of citizenship” lies “at the heart”48 of 
the United Kingdom’s Freedom of Information Act.49  The same pre-
sumption is also a fundamental aspect of American citizenship and 
rests at the heart of FOIA.  But that truth often has been obscured by 
government’s failure to acknowledge that the First Amendment “right 
to know” is a foundational value of our form of government, the cen-
tral animating value of FOIA, and the key to interpreting FOIA.  
Courts often talk about FOIA as embodying competing, yet presuma-
bly co-equal, values of disclosure and secrecy,50 but that narrative is 
                                                          
(as opposed to permitted) by law or when an agency “reasonably foresees that disclosure 
would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions.”  See Memorandum 
from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen. to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf.  But see Wald, supra note 
14 (discussing the Obama Administration’s slowness in responding to FOIA requests in 
light of its position that “government should operate under the presumption that docu-
ments should be released, unless there [is] a reason not to do so”); Scott Shane, Obama 
Steps Up Prosecution of Leaks to the News Media, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at A1; Joshua Keat-
ing, Is the Obama Administration Abusing the Espionage Act?, FOREIGN POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 27, 
2012, 3:26 PM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/27/is_the_obama_admin 
istration_abusing_the_espionage_act#.T71igj_h2uk.email. 
 46.  493 U.S. 146 (1989). 
 47.  Id. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 48.  Claire McDougall, An Introduction to the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000: Part II, 7 JUD. REV. 253, 255 (2002). 
 49.  Freedom of Information Act, 2000, c. 36 (Eng.). 
 50.  See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 
144 (1981) (“[The] FOIA was intended by Congress to balance the public’s need for ac-
cess to official information with the Government’s need for confidentiality.”); EPA v. Mink, 
410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (“It is in the context of the Act’s attempt to provide a ‘workable 
formula’ that ‘balances, and protects all interests,’ that the conflicting claims over the 
documents in this case must be considered.”); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980) (“[The] FOIA represents a carefully balanced 
scheme of public rights and agency obligations . . . .”).  Another example can be found in 
FAA v. Robertson, in which the Court stated: 
The Act has two aspects.  In one, it seeks to open public records to greater public 
access; in the other, it seeks to preserve the confidentiality undeniably essential 
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not an accurate one.  At the time FOIA was enacted, there was a sur-
feit of secrecy and an information drought.  The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act was a remedial statute, and it was not intended to preserve 
light and dark in equal measure.  Instead, it was intended to enforce 
the constitutional “right to know” by creating a presumption in favor 
of disclosure. 
To ignore FOIA’s constitutional underpinnings ill serves the ide-
al of transparency as an essential feature of representative democracy, 
particularly where transparency may be challenged by other weighty 
considerations, such as national security concerns.51  That is particu-
larly true now, when the balance of power has shifted so strongly in 
favor of the executive as a general matter52 and our public life has be-
come increasingly dominated by concerns about national security, in-
cluding the felt demands of a “war on terror” that has no foreseeable 
end, a seemingly strategic use of fear in the conduct of domestic poli-
tics, and a perhaps unprecedented willingness on the part of govern-
ment to embark on wars of choice that may involve immense fiscal 
and human costs.  In this new world, the executive has successfully 
claimed broad new substantive powers, including the purported au-
thority to assassinate those suspected of terrorism—including United 
                                                          
in certain areas of Government operations.  It is axiomatic that all parts of an Act 
if at all possible, are to be given effect. . . .  In Mink, the Court set out the general 
nature and purpose of the Act, recognizing, as did the Senate committee report, 
that it is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests . . . and provid[e] a 
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests. 
422 U.S. 255, 261–62 (1975) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  Chief Justice Burger observed that, “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no gov-
ernmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”  Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)); see also 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The national se-
curity, after all, is the primary responsibility and purpose of the Federal Government.”).  
National security has been broadly defined to mean “the national defense, foreign rela-
tions, or economic interests of the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2) (2006).  Mei-
klejohn argued for the priority of political freedom, noting that “the progress of political 
freedom gives better assurance of national security than does any program of political op-
pression and enslavement.”  Meiklejohn, Mean?, supra note 21, at 479. 
 52.  See Barry Sullivan, Methods and Materials in Constitutional Law: Some Thoughts on Ac-
cess to Government Information as a Problem for Constitutional Theory and Socio-Legal Studies, 13 
EUR. J.L. REFORM 4, 11–14 (2011) [hereinafter Sullivan, Methods] (discussing the growth of 
executive power). 
  
22 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
States citizens—anywhere in the world.53  In these circumstances, only 
an interpretation of FOIA that is informed by its quasi-constitutional 
status and the First Amendment values that underlie it can possibly 
keep demands for secrecy from swamping the legitimate needs of 
transparency. 
Part II of this Article will begin by briefly reviewing the intellec-
tual background of the “right-to-know” problem.  Part II also will con-
sider the relationship between notions of citizenship and access to 
government information.  It will discuss the relevant insights of James 
Madison, Benjamin Constant, and Jacques Maritain, among others.  It 
will also consider some of the supranational texts that gave rise to the 
recognition of an individually enforceable right of access to infor-
mation, as well as the text of the First Amendment and related juris-
prudence.  Finally, Part II will emphasize constitutional change and 
the dynamic development of representative democracy in America, as 
well as the twentieth-century contributions of scholars, such as Alex-
ander Meiklejohn and Thomas I. Emerson, who found a “right to 
know” in the First Amendment. 
Part III will discuss the Pentagon Papers and Houchins cases, as well 
as the scholarly work of those who opposed the recognition of any 
constitutional obligation on the part of the government to make in-
formation available to the public.  That opposition was based on 
grounds of textualism, practicability, and theoretical understandings 
about the proper role of citizens.  With the possible exception of 
Lillian BeVier, who argued that citizens have only a passive role to 
play in representative government, all of the scholars surveyed recog-
nized that access to government information is a core constitutional 
value, regardless of whether it is an independently enforceable consti-
tutional right.  Part III will also discuss case law that similarly acknowl-
edges the centrality of this constitutional value.  Part III will conclude 
                                                          
 53.  See Peter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, WASH. POST, Oct. 
1, 2011, at A1 (discussing the presidentially authorized use of an unmanned drone to kill a 
U.S. citizen).  The Administration has refused to release the legal memorandum that al-
legedly justifies the president’s authority to undertake such unilateral actions.  Scott Hor-
ton, The Drone Secrecy Farce, HARPER’S MAG. (Mar. 13, 2012), http://harpers.org/archive/ 
2012/03/hbc-90008485.  At the same time, Administration officials gave speeches in which 
they argued that the president has the constitutional power to authorize such actions. See 
Carrie Johnson, Holder Spells Out Why Drones Target U.S. Citizens, NPR (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/06/148000630/holder-gives-rationale-for-drone-strikes-on-
citizens. 
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by suggesting that this constitutional value is at the heart of FOIA, 
which must be encountered and interpreted in that light.54 
Finally, Part IV will consider the Supreme Court’s FOIA jurispru-
dence and its insufficient attention to the central purpose of FOIA, as 
well as some lower court cases that reflect an extreme deference to 
government assertions of possible harm to national security, whether 
real or imagined, immediate or remote.  Part IV will also suggest that 
a clear understanding of the constitutional value underlying FOIA—
the people’s right to the fullest responsible disclosure—can assist the 
judiciary in the essential but challenging task of holding the executive 
to account when it argues against disclosure by invoking grounds such 
as national security or foreign affairs interests, grounds that are 
weighty indeed, but also easy to assert and difficult to test.55  Finally, 
this Part will suggest that the political branches must seriously consid-
                                                          
 54.  The focus of this Article is the courts’ failure to interpret FOIA in light of the First 
Amendment values that animate it.  The Article does not aim to prove that the Court nec-
essarily erred in rejecting the “right to know” as an individually enforceable right.  None-
theless, one can easily imagine an exceptional case in which FOIA does not mandate dis-
closure of materials that the government wishes to keep secret, but disclosure is 
nonetheless essential to informed public debate about matters of surpassing public im-
portance.  That is the possibility left open by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
Ontario (Pub. Safety & Sec.) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Ass’n, [2010] S.C.R. 815 (Can.). 
 55.  Dramatic reversals of doctrine may be difficult to achieve, not only because of the 
practical difficulties inherent in evaluating the government’s assertions, but also because 
of the natural inclination of judges to tread lightly in such areas.  See David Dyzenhaus, Cy-
cles of Legality in Emergency Times, 18 PUB. L. REV. 165, 169–70 (2007).  That attitude is 
doubtless attributable in part to the judiciary’s lack of confidence in its ability to assess for 
itself the truth and sufficiency of the government’s arguments in this context.  Keith D. 
Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act, 2004 PUB. L. 829; Conor Gearty, The Cost of Hu-
man Rights, in 47(2) LEGAL PROBLEMS 19, 40 (1994); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and 
the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452 (2005).  It may be that new procedures, such as 
special advocates or specialized courts, would further enhance the courts’ ability to safe-
guard the proper balance between legitimate security concerns and democratic values, but 
such solutions are themselves problematic.  The limits ordinarily placed on special advo-
cates have raised due process concerns, while specialized tribunals are problematic be-
cause of concerns about democratic legitimacy as well as practical recruitment issues, given 
the need to have decisions rendered by persons who are both expert and impartial.  Those 
questions are best left for another day.  See, e.g., TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 103–09 
(2010) (discussing the procedures that English courts have followed in an effort to ensure 
fair trials). 
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er the importance of these constitutional values in their own encoun-
ters with FOIA. 
At the very least, basic democratic values must be given their due, 
and government assertions with respect to the need for secrecy must 
be subjected to a more rigorous scrutiny. 
II.  CITIZENSHIP, THE DUTY OF INFORMED PUBLIC DISCUSSION, AND THE 
DEVELOPING “RIGHT TO KNOW” 
The evolution of American thought and jurisprudence about the 
“right to know” in the second half of the twentieth century can best be 
understood in connection with developing understandings about the 
relationship between the citizen and the state in a representative de-
mocracy.  While the conversation about the nature of that relation-
ship began long ago, it became intense in the post-war period. 
One understanding of the relationship between citizenship and 
the “right to know,” which reflects a strong notion of active citizen-
ship, may be found in the national and supranational rights instru-
ments that were adopted during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury: in the aftermath of the World War II, after the fall of 
Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and at the end of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa.  Jacques Maritain, the French phi-
losopher whose thought is reflected in some of those instruments,56 
                                                          
 56.  SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 53–54, 64–65 
(2010).  Maritain was a Thomist philosopher, democratic theorist, and public intellectual; 
he was criticized by some mainstream Catholic leaders for his liberal political positions, 
such as his refusal to join other Catholic intellectuals in supporting the Franco regime.  JAY 
P. CORRIN, CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 371–72 (2002).  
As Corrin notes: 
Many influential Catholic leaders passionately defended authoritarian forms of 
governance.  The Vatican’s official response to modern democratic governance 
was dilatory and was not clarified until Pope John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical Pacem 
in Terris.  Yet the arguments it made for constitutional democracy had already 
been set down by the liberal Catholics of the Sturzo-Maritain persuasion. 
Id. at 386.  It is difficult to exaggerate Maritain’s influence on Catholic thinking about de-
mocracy.  As Paul Sigmund has observed: 
Maritain was responsible for a new development in Catholic political thought . . . 
the argument that democracy was not simply one of several forms of govern-
ment, all of which were acceptable provided that they promoted the ‘common 
good,’ but was the one . . . most in keeping with the nature of man and with 
Christian values. 
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viewed active participation in government as a privilege and a duty of 
democratic citizenship.  Like Alexis de Tocqueville and Benjamin 
Constant, Maritain did not believe that the citizen’s role properly 
could be confined to participating in periodic elections and obeying 
the law.57  Maritain wrote: 
Perhaps it is easier for men to renounce active participation 
in political life; in certain cases it may even have happened 
that they felt happier and freer from care while dwelling in 
the commonwealth as political slaves, or while passively 
handing over to their leaders all the care of the manage-
ment of the community.  But in this case they gave up a priv-
ilege proper to their nature, one of these privileges which, in 
a sense, make life more difficult and which bring with them 
a greater or lesser amount of labor, strain and suffering, but 
which correspond to human dignity.58 
Maritain attributed great importance to freedom of the press, ob-
serving that “the people obey a sound political reflex when they stick 
                                                          
Paul E. Sigmund, The Catholic Tradition and Modern Democracy, 49 REV. POL. 530, 540 
(1987).  The influence of Maritain and others, such as John Courtney Murray, S.J., the 
American Jesuit and public intellectual, in pushing the Catholic Church leadership away 
from a hierarchical view of society antagonistic towards democracy is well-illustrated by the 
fact that, as late as 1943, Monsignor John A. Ryan, who was widely considered to be Ameri-
ca’s “foremost Catholic liberal,” was able to observe, in conformity with Catholic social 
teaching, that “legal segregation was morally wrong,” but that equal access to the franchise 
could not be urged on moral grounds because “[t]he only moral right possessed by the 
citizen in the political field is the right to have a government that promotes the common 
good,” which is an “end [that] can be obtained without universal suffrage.”  JOHN T. 
MCCREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 298 (2003) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  That orthodoxy, which had prevailed for centuries, was exploded by 
the Council documents.  See MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 47-54 
(2012) (describing the dramatic change in Catholic teaching about democracy). 
 57.  JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 67 (1951) [hereinafter MARITAIN, MAN 
AND THE STATE] (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 341–42 (1862)).  
Accord Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared to That of the Moderns, in 
BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 325–26 (Biancamaria Fontana ed., 1988) (argu-
ing that protection of the “liberty of the ancients” requires citizens to exercise “an active 
and constant surveillance over their representatives.”). 
 58.  JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 84 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN].  Maritain notes that a representative democracy 
should be understood as “an advance towards justice and law and towards the liberation of 
the human being.”  Id. at 53. 
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to the freedom of the press as to a sacred good and protection.”59  He 
also thought that “freedom of speech and expression” was too narrow 
a phrase to cabin the essence of the concept it was meant to express; 
he proposed the alternative phrase “freedom of investigation and dis-
cussion.”60  That freedom “has a strictly political value,” Maritain ar-
gued, “because it is necessary to the common effort to augment and 
diffuse the true and the good,” and it is in “man’s very nature . . . to 
seek the truth.”61  Maritain’s influence is reflected in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”),62 which he 
helped draft, and in other instruments that were modeled on it.63 
The Universal Declaration proclaims that “[e]veryone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . includ[ing the] free-
dom . . . to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers.”64  The European Convention 
on Human Rights builds on that idea, providing that, “[e]veryone has 
the right to freedom of expression [including the right] to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers.”65  Similar provisions appear in 
other national and supranational instruments.66  They reflect the 
sense of urgency and idealism of post-war Europe.  Because of the on-
                                                          
 59.  MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note 57, at 66. 
 60.  MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 58, at 89.  As Wil Waluchow has noted, 
the language of the First Amendment, being limited to “speech,” has required a certain 
amount of interpretive virtuosity.  Wil Waluchow, Constitutions as Living Trees: An Idiot De-
fends, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 207, 233–34 (2005). 
 61.  MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 58, at 89.  Maritain also gives specific 
attention to freedom of association.  Id. 
 62.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at 71 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 63.  See MOYN, supra note 56, at 54; MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 51, 230 
(2001).  In negotiating the Universal Declaration, Maritain and others believed that con-
sensus could be reached only by focusing on practical grounds, rather than on abstract or 
underlying principles.  See id., at 77–78. 
 64.  G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, supra note 62, ¶ 19. 
 65.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 231 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 66.  See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” 
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I at 1–2 (Ger.); KONSTYTUCJA 
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [Constitution] art. 54 (Pol.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 16. 
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set of the Cold War, however, those instruments often failed to have 
the immediate impact that some of their proponents intended.67  The 
provisions relating to access to information were no exception, but, 
like other such freedom of expression provisions, they were written in 
broad language that afforded ample room for future interpretation.68  
Indeed, at least two transnational courts have interpreted such provi-
sions to mandate government disclosure of information that would 
not otherwise be disclosed.69  In one case, the European Court of 
                                                          
 67.  See MOYN, supra note 56, at 2 (describing the Cold War’s displacement of the post-
war human rights agenda).  Eric Muller makes a similar point: 
The perpetrators [of German atrocities] whose convictions stuck were mostly the 
low-ranking thugs with blood on their hands; the mid- and upper-level function-
aries who set up and ran the machinery of repression from their desks were most 
often exonerated. Scholars debate the reasons, but the continued presence of 
former Nazis in the West German judiciary surely played a role, as did the geopo-
litical need of the United States to bolster West Germany in the fight against So-
viet communism.  For this latter reason, American pressure on the West Ger-
mans to root out and punish their Nazi malefactors largely evaporated in the late 
1940s.  With no external pressure to keep their gaze on their uncomfortable 
past, most West Germans preferred to look away. 
Eric L. Muller, Of Nazis, Americans, and Educating Against Catastrophe, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 323, 
355 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 68.  See, e.g., David Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 
YALE L.J. 1717, 1736 (2003) (“The genius of the Constitution is that it is specific where 
specificity is valuable, general where generality is valuable—and that it does not put us in 
unacceptable situations that we can’t plausibly interpret our way out of.”); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Most constitutional issues 
derive from the broad standards of fairness written into the Constitution . . . and the divi-
sion of power as between States and Nation.  Such questions, by their very nature, allow a 
relatively wide play for individual legal judgment.”). 
 69.  See, e.g., HCLU v. Hungary, supra note 20 (recognizing the right of access to official 
documents); Claude-Reyes, supra note 20 (upholding the public’s right to seek information 
and finding the government’s duty to provide it)  In HCLU v. Hungary, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court had given a contrary interpretation to language contained in the 
Hungarian Constitution.  HCLU v. Hungary, supra note 20, ¶ 35.  That Constitution has 
since been replaced.  Judy Dempsey, Hungarian Parliament Approves New Constitution, 
N.Y.TIMES.COM (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/europe/ 
19iht-hungary19.html (discussing the enactment of the new constitution).  The provisions 
contained in the new constitution have provoked serious concern and controversy, both 
within Hungary and within the larger European community.  See James Kanter, European 
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Human Rights held that Hungary’s “obligations in matters of freedom 
of the press [obligations which extend to “social watchdogs” perform-
ing traditional press functions, as well as to the press itself] include 
the elimination of barriers to the exercise of press functions where, in 
issues of public interest, such barriers exist solely because of an in-
formation monopoly held by the authorities.”70  Similarly, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has recognized “the right of the 
individual to receive . . . information and the positive obligation of 
the State to provide it.”71 
The constitutional law of the United States has somewhat differ-
ent roots and developed along different lines.  The Constitution and 
Bill of Rights were framed at a different constitutional moment, when 
the very concepts of democracy, representation, and citizenship were 
under construction, and when the working out of the proper relation-
                                                          
Body Threatens to Sue Hungary over its Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, at A9; Palko Karasz 
& Melissa Eddy, Opposition Protests Constitution in Hungary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, at A4. 
 70.  HCLU v. Hungary, supra note 20, ¶ 36.  The HCLU argued that “to receive and 
impart information is a precondition of freedom of expression, since one could not form 
or hold a well-founded opinion without knowing the relevant and accurate facts.”  Id. at 
para. 22.  The HCLU further argued that: 
The disclosure of public information on request is . . . within the notion of the 
right “to receive” . . . .  This provision protects not only those who wish to inform 
others but also those who seek to receive such information.  To hold otherwise 
would mean that freedom of expression is no more than the absence of censor-
ship, which would be incompatible with the above-mentioned positive obliga-
tions. 
Id. ¶ 23. 
 71.  Claude-Reyes, supra note 20, ¶ 77.  The court also recognized the government’s ob-
ligation to provide a justification when limiting access to information “in a specific case” 
“for any reason permitted by the Convention.”  Id.  In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of 
Canada recently held that Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which guarantees only “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication,” Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 
1982, c. 11 (U.K.), does not “entail[] a general constitutional right of access to all infor-
mation under the control of government,” but the Court accepted the proposition that 
“[a]ccess is a derivative right which may arise where it is a necessary precondition of mean-
ingful expression on the functioning of government,” leaving open the possibility that re-
lief might be granted where “meaningful public discussion and criticism . . . would [other-
wise] be substantially impeded.”  Ontario (Pub. Safety & Sec.) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Ass’n, 
[2010] S.C.R. 815 para. 30, 31, 35, 37 (Can.). 
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ship between the governors and the governed stood at a different 
stage.72 
The First Amendment contains no explicit guarantee of access to 
information, whether for the general benefit of the public or for the 
special benefit of the press, either with respect to information gener-
ally or with respect to information created or maintained by the gov-
                                                          
 72.  See, e.g., POLE, supra note 8, at 133 (noting that the relationship “between ruler 
and ruled” was still evolving at the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787); WOOD, 
supra note 9, at 28–29 (explaining that American citizens sought a different kind of rela-
tionship with their government than what they had with England).  The very idea of repre-
sentation was under development.  In England, thinking about representation emphasized 
the representative’s independence; his obligation to the nation as a whole, rather than to a 
particular constituency; and the legitimacy of representation unconnected to popular elec-
tion.  As Edmund Burke famously remarked, the representative owed the country his “un-
biased opinion, his mature judgment, [and] his enlightened conscience, [which] he ought 
not to sacrifice to [anyone].”  Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 
1774), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 391, 392 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds., 1987).  Neither the concept of virtual representation nor the idea of parliamentary 
supremacy had the same traction in the American colonies.  WOOD, supra note 9, at 28–29.  
But constitutional change came to England as well.  As Robert Dahl has pointed out, the 
government of the United States might well have been created as a parliamentary system if 
the process of constitution-making had occurred a generation later, when the English par-
liamentary system had further evolved towards its modern form.  See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON 
DEMOCRACY 123 (1998) (“Although by now parliamentary government is all but unthinka-
ble among Americans, had their Constitutional Convention been held some thirty years 
later it is altogether possible that the delegates would have proposed a parliamentary sys-
tem.  For what they . . . did not understand was that the British constitutional system was 
itself undergoing rapid change.”).  Another important question, of course, was the extent 
to which authority was delegated to representatives or retained by the people.  John A. 
Macdonald, one of the fathers of Canadian confederation, strongly believed that even so 
fundamental a question as confederation was properly left to representatives, with “no 
need . . . for the people to say what they felt, either in an election or a plebiscite.”  
RICHARD GWYN, JOHN A.: THE MAN WHO MADE US: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN A. 
MACDONALD 346 (2007).  The question has not lost its currency.  In recent years, much 
discussion has occurred within the European Union about whether the member states 
should ratify foundational treaties by popular referendum or parliamentary action.  The 
choice may depend on political considerations as well as constitutional requirements.  See, 
e.g., Gavin Barrett, A Rough Passage: Lessons from the Experience of the Ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty in Ireland, in THE MAKING OF THE EU’S LISBON TREATY: THE ROLE OF THE MEMBER 
STATES 273 (Finn Laursen ed., 2012);Carlos Closa, Why Convene Referendums? Explaining 
Choices in EU Constitutional Politics, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POLICY 1311 (2007). 
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ernment.73  Moreover, courts have not construed the First Amend-
ment to encompass any general “right to know,” in the sense of creat-
ing an affirmative, individually enforceable governmental obligation 
to provide information within its control or to remove barriers that 
otherwise exist.74 
The founders were men of their times.75  They were content to 
leave slavery in place as the price of union.76  They were not necessari-
                                                          
 73.  The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The law 
of the First Amendment has been shaped by the eighteenth century text, but also by mod-
ern circumstances, such as the Cold War, in which the values of the First Amendment have 
been invoked or challenged.  HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN AMERICA 301–99 (Jamie Kalven, ed., 1988); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS 
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 395–96 (2004).  By contrast, the text of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa contains a broad guarantee of access to information, which apparently ap-
plies generally and not simply against the government.  See S. AFR. CONST. 1996. art. 16 
(protecting the right to receive information).  In practice, the right to know has been un-
der serious attack in South Africa.  See John Eligon, South Africa Passes Law to Restrict Report-
ing of Government Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at A4 (describing a bill that would re-
strict the ability of journalists to report secret government information); Tracy McVeigh, 
Nobel Laureate Nadine Gordimer Accuses the ANC of Apartheid-Style Censorship, OBSERVER, Nov. 
27, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/27/nadine-gordimer-
south-africa-anc-secrecy-law-censorship (last visited July 21, 2012) (same). 
 74.  See STONE, supra note 73, at 5–9 (discussing First Amendment case law develop-
ment). 
 75.  See RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN 
THE NEW REPUBLIC 31 (1987) (“[I]t is a safer presumption to treat the past, including our 
national past, as different or as possibly even strange.  In doing so we reduce the likelihood 
of our unwittingly smoothing away or overlooking whatever might be distinctive in that 
earlier period.”); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Consti-
tution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“[T]he government [the framers] devised was defec-
tive from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social trans-
formation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the 
individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.”). 
 76.  See Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp. (remarks of Mr. Rutlidge, Aug 
21) (“Interest alone is the governing principle with nations.  The true question at present 
is whether the Southern States shall or not be parties of the Union.”). 
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ly committed to universal suffrage.77  Despite the entreaties of Abigail 
Adams, they did not “Remember the Ladies.”78  Their notion of “the 
people” was far less inclusive than that which the Constitution en-
shrines today.  But the founders also were sailing largely uncharted 
seas with respect to designing a representative government.79 
In designing “a government which is to be administered by men 
over men,” James Madison, writing as “Publius,” explained in Federalist 
51 that “the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the gov-
ernment to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to 
controul itself.”80  He continued: “A dependence on the people is no 
doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”81  Moreover, 
too great a dependence on the people was also to be guarded against.  
If a majority could make its will felt too easily, the government’s poli-
cies would lack wisdom and stability and be too susceptible to fickle 
                                                          
 77.  See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2000) (“Perhaps owing to the absence of some of 
the revolution’s most democratic leaders (including Jefferson, Paine, Samuel Adams, and 
Patrick Henry), there was no formal debate [at the Constitutional Convention] about the 
possibility of a national standard more inclusive than the laws already prevailing in the 
states.”).  “By 1790 . . . roughly 60 to 70 percent of adult white men (and very few others) 
could vote.”  Id. at 21; see also CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY 
TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 19 (1960) (“Confining the vote in colony elections to those 
who were free, white, twenty-one, native-born Protestant males who were the owners of 
property, especially the owners of real property, appeared to be the best guarantee of the 
stability of the commonwealth.”). 
 78.  Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 518. 
 79.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 8th 
prtg. 1977) (“It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the 
people of this country . . . to decide the important question, whether societies of men are 
really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or 
whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident 
and force.”); POLE, supra note 8, at 141–42 (comparing the older concept of virtual repre-
sentation with the newer view, which assumed “a closer and more continuous nexus be-
tween legislators and the people,” and concluding that “no linear process of transition can 
be traced from the earlier to the later”). 
 80.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 8th prtg. 
1977). 
 81.  Id. 
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fashion, without a proper regard for the long-term needs and inter-
ests of the nation as a whole.82 
A pure democracy was thought to be theoretically undesirable as 
well as practically impossible.83  As Gordon Wood wrote, “[t]hrough 
the structural devices of the new federal government [the Federalists] 
sought to perpetuate an elitist conception of representation even 
though political and social conditions in America were making a con-
tinuation of such elite rule difficult if not impossible to sustain.”84  
                                                          
 82.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 8th 
prtg. 1977) (“This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitu-
tion and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of 
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among 
the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information 
and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the mean time to occasion dangerous 
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the com-
munity.”); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional In-
terpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1997) (“The decision to create a single written 
constitution, and thus depart from a model of parliamentary supremacy, is based on the 
possibility of varying views about fundamental questions, and the undesirability of leaving 
their resolution to shifting political fortunes.  Moreover, one reason for being suspicious 
of shifting political fortunes is that they shift so frequently. Without a written constitution 
as a stabilizing force, there is a risk that too many issues needing at least intermediate term 
settlement will remain excessively uncertain.”).  Maritain also recognized the problem of 
shifting sentiments in democratic societies; he distinguished between “momentary trends 
of opinion” and “the real needs of the multitude.”  MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra 
note 57, at 137. 
 83.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 8th prtg. 
1977) (“A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representa-
tion takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seek-
ing. . . .  The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first, 
the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by 
the rest: secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over 
which the latter may be extended.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 428 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 8th prtg. 1977) (arguing that the government was to be a repre-
sentative government, rather than a classical democracy). 
 84.  WOOD, supra note 9, at 54.  The national government was to be a government of 
limited powers, and the requirements for voting in federal elections were left to the states.  
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that “the Electors [in congressional elections] in 
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous 
Branch of the State Legislature”); id. amend. X (providing that “[t]he powers not delegat-
ed to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
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Significantly, neither the president nor the members of the upper 
house would be elected directly by the people and, while the mem-
bers of the lower house would be subject to direct election, they 
would be so few in number that only members of the elite were likely 
to gain election.  Again, as Gordon Wood wrote: 
 The Anti-Federalists thus came to oppose the new national 
government for the very reason the Federalists favored it: 
because its very structure and detachment from the people 
would work to exclude any kind of actual and local-interest 
representation and prevent ordinary middling men from 
exercising political power.  It went almost without saying 
that the awesome president and the exalted Senate would be 
dangerously far removed from the people.  But even the 
“democratic branch” of the government, the House of Rep-
resentatives, which presumably should “possess the same in-
terests and opinions that the people themselves would pos-
sess, were they all assembled,” was, with its scant sixty-five 
members, only “a mere shred or rag” of the people’s power, 
and hardly a match for the monarchical and aristocratic 
branches of the government.  When the number of repre-
sentatives was “so small,” declared the Anti-Federalists of 
Pennsylvania, “the office will be highly elevated and distin-
guished; the style in which the members live will probably be 
high; circumstances of this kind will render the place of a 
representative not a desirable one to sensible, substantial 
                                                          
to the States respectively, or to the people”).  In addition, the president was to be elected 
by an electoral college, rather than by the people, and the method for selecting the mem-
bers of the electoral college also was left to the states.  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3.  Senators were 
to be chosen by the state legislatures for six-year terms, while the representatives would be 
popularly elected for two-year terms.  Id. art. I, § 2, § 3, cl. 1.  Some delegates had even fa-
vored the use of an indirect election for choosing members of the House of Representa-
tives, but that view did not prevail.  ADRIENNE KOCH, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 38–45 (1966).  Moreover, the Execu-
tive could negate the work of the legislative branch, subject to reversal by supermajorities 
in both houses.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  Presumably, the existence of a written consti-
tution to be interpreted by judges also would limit the powers of the people.  See Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151–52 (1803) (noting that the structure of the Consti-
tution is one in which the power of the people runs through an independent judiciary); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 82 (viewing judges as “faithful guardians of the Consti-
tution”). 
  
34 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
men, who have been used to walk in the plain and frugal 
paths of life.”85 
Viewed from this perspective, the “auxiliary precautions” must 
take center stage.86  The national government would combine fea-
tures of representation, federalism, indirect election, separated pow-
ers, and bicameralism, so that the influence of factions would be 
checked and dispersed, the powers of government would be diffused, 
and “[t]he rule of the people [would] be largely indirect.”87  At least 
at the national level, there was not much work for the people to do.88 
Although James Madison put great faith in the efficacy of such 
structural arrangements at the Constitutional Convention and during 
the ratification debates, he later stressed the importance of a more ac-
tive sense of citizenship and a greater role for public opinion in a rep-
resentative government.  As Richard Brookhiser has observed: 
 In 1791, after the Constitution was ratified, Madison sat 
down to rethink some of the most important debates he had 
just won.  In The Federalist he had argued that the very size of 
the United States and the complexity of its new federal sys-
tem would buttress liberty, since malign factions would find 
it hard to seize power.  But now he decided that another 
guarantee was necessary: enlightened public opinion, which 
would spot threats to liberty and unite “with a holy zeal” to 
repel them.  In a new series of essays . . . he teased out the 
consequences of this idea. . . .  [I]n the early 1790s, regularly 
consulting public opinion was a new concept.  Many of Mad-
ison’s colleagues, including Washington and Hamilton, had 
little use for it.  They thought the people should rule when 
they voted, then let the victors do their best until the next 
election.  But Madison glimpsed our world before it exist-
ed.89 
In 1792, Madison wrote that, “[t]o secure all the advantages of [a 
federal republic], every good citizen will be at once a centinel over 
the rights of the people; over the authorities of the confederal gov-
ernment; and over both the rights and the authorities of the interme-
                                                          
 85.  WOOD, supra note 9, at 58–59 (footnotes omitted). 
 86.  See FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 80 (arguing that “auxiliary precautions” are 
necessary when power is given to the people). 
 87.  Sullivan, Methods, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
 88.  Id. at 9. 
 89.  BROOKHISER, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
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diate governments.”90  As Brookhiser noted, “Madison now believed 
in more than popular choice.  He wanted the people to be consulted 
between elections, continually.  They would be his partners in gov-
ernment.”91 
In time, Madison’s “popular Government” would become more 
“popular.”  Indeed, the overall effect of constitutional amendments 
and judicial interpretations has been transformative.  An electoral col-
lege continues to choose the president, but senators are now chosen 
by voters, not by state legislatures, and the federal franchise has been 
greatly extended, removing barriers based on race, sex, age, and the 
ability to pay a poll tax.92  Judicial decisions and federal legislation 
have worked similar changes in the states.93  The net effect of these 
                                                          
 90.  JAMES MADISON, Government, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 1772-1836, at 502 (Lib. 
Am. 1999). 
 91.  BROOKHISER, supra note 5, at 106–07.  In retirement, Madison would elaborate on 
that view of citizenship in a much-quoted letter praising Kentucky’s commitment to educa-
tion:  
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring 
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.  Knowledge will 
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, 
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. 
Letter to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 90, at 790. 
 92.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servi-
tude); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (conferring citizenship on former slaves, prohibiting the states 
from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens, and guaranteeing due process 
and equal protection); id. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgment of the right 
to vote based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XVII (provid-
ing for popular election of senators); id. amend. XIX (extending the vote to women); id. 
amend. XXIII (providing for electors from the District of Columbia); id. amend. XXIV 
(prohibiting the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on failure to pay poll or 
other tax); id. amend. XXVI (prohibiting the denial or abridgment of the right to vote 
based on age with respect to anyone eighteen years of age or older).  In a formal sense, 
those provisions constitute the United States as a more democratic nation than that which 
the framers created.  On a practical level, some reservations may be in order, however, be-
cause of the increased dominance of the executive and the distortion occasioned by the 
influence of money in the political process.  See SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE, supra note 
7, at 199–202 (describing the influence of corporate campaign contributions on elections 
and the conduct of government); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 7, at 115 (explaining 
how money and position influence elections). 
 93.  See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (prohibiting states 
from denying an individual the right to vote “on account of race or color”); Reynolds v. 
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changes has been greater than the sum of their parts.  What once was 
a representative government has since moved closer to being a repre-
sentative democracy.  As these changes have occurred, and as the 
government has become more democratic (at least in a formal sense), 
Madison’s more robust view of citizenship has gained traction. 
By 1927, Justice Brandeis felt justified in attributing such a con-
ception of citizenship to the founding generation.  In his concurring 
opinion in Whitney v. California,94 Justice Brandeis asserted that: 
 Those who won our independence believed . . . that free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; 
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be 
futile; . . . that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this 
should be a fundamental principle of the American gov-
ernment.95 
Justice Brandeis was not alone.  John Dewey, also in 1927, pub-
lished The Public and Its Problems, in which he described the “citizen-
voter” as “an officer of the public [who] expresses his will as a repre-
sentative of the public interest as much so as does a senator or sher-
iff.”96  Dewey also recognized the central importance of informed 
                                                          
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-81 (1964) (holding that the principle of “one man, one vote” re-
quired legislative districts to be drawn in a way that they are roughly equal in population); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (overruling existing precedent to  hold that redis-
tricting issues were not simply political issues, but presented justiciable questions, and that 
a citizen’s right to vote cannot be “arbitrar[ily] impaired” by a state action that dilutes his 
vote); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960) (holding that an Alabama state 
law that transformed the city of Tuskeegee from a geographically square unit to an “un-
couth” twenty-eight-sided entity, removing all but a handful of potential African-American 
voters, violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 94.  274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 95.  Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233, 243 (1936) (discussing “the natural right of the members of an organized society, 
united for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their common 
interests”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940) (“The freedom of speech 
and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss 
publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of 
subsequent punishment. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic func-
tion . . . must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to ena-
ble the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”). 
 96.  JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 75 (Swallow Press Inc. 1954) (1927). 
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public debate: “The essential need . . . is the improvement of the 
methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.  That is 
the problem of the public.”97  The significance that Dewey attributed 
to active citizenship was part and parcel of his view of democracy, 
which he considered to be “more than a form of government; it is 
primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated ex-
perience.”98 
Alexander Meiklejohn, the philosopher and First Amendment 
scholar, made the strongest case for the connection between active 
citizenship and access to information in the years following World 
War II.99 As the World War II era gave way to the Cold War, the task of 
guarding public safety, while also ensuring the continued vitality of 
democratic institutions, took on a new urgency.  In Meiklejohn’s aus-
tere view, the central purpose of the First Amendment was not to pro-
tect an individual’s right to self-expression or self-realization, but to 
ensure the robust public debate necessary for self-government.100  For 
                                                          
 97.  Id. at 208.  Dewey also observed that “this improvement depends essentially upon 
freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of dissemination of their conclusions.”  
Id.  It is not enough, Dewey argued, to assume that “the masses” are incapable of political 
judgment and should be protected from themselves.  See id. at 209 (“Until secrecy, preju-
dice, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda as well as sheer ignorance are replaced by 
inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling how apt for judgment of social policies the 
existing intelligence of the masses may be.”). 
 98.  JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 101 (Mcmillan Co. 1922); see also John Dewey, The Ethics of De-
mocracy, in 1 THE EARLY WORKS, 1882-1898, at 240–41 (1969) (“Democracy, in a word, is a 
social, that is to say, an ethical conception, and upon its ethical significance is based its 
significance as governmental.  Democracy is a form of government only because it is a 
form of moral and spiritual association.”).  Matthew Lewans has observed that, “Dewey’s 
ideas about ‘intelligent social action’ do not involve the subordination of individual inter-
ests to the authority of state officials interrupted only periodically by elections, but pro-
vides a philosophical framework for sustained and honest democratic discourse; a dis-
course which requires officials to provide public reasons for their decisions which are 
capable of sustaining and extending the consensus which makes civil society possible and 
enables the community to resolve problems in a legitimate and intelligent manner.”  
MATTHEW LEWANS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE (forthcoming Dec. 
2012). 
 99.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 100.  MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 21, at 88–89.  Meiklejohn distinguished be-
tween two kinds of freedom of speech: (1) the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, which is imbued with a public purpose because it is essential to informed 
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Meiklejohn, the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment is not based on “a sentimental vagary about the ‘natural rights’ 
of individuals,” but on “a reasoned and sober judgment as to the best 
available method of guarding the public safety.”101  Its value is instru-
mental.  Significantly, the First Amendment is concerned with the 
success of representative government, which depends on an educated, 
informed, and engaged citizenry.  For Meiklejohn, the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment is analogous—and ante-
cedent—to that which the Speech and Debate Clause grants to legisla-
tors: 
The freedom which we grant to our representatives is merely 
a derivative of the prior freedom which belongs to us as vot-
ers.  In spite of all the dangers it involves, Article I, section 6, 
suggests that the First Amendment means what it says: In the 
field of common action, of public discussion, the freedom of 
speech shall not be abridged.102 
The First Amendment does not protect “talkativeness;” nor does 
it “require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in pub-
lic debate.”103  “What is essential,” according to Meiklejohn, is “that 
everything worth saying shall be said.”104 
                                                          
discussion about matters of public concern, and (2) the “liberty of speech” protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which is a private right serving private purposes.  
Id. at 37–39.  The former is “absolute,” while the latter, like other aspects of liberty, may be 
balanced, adjusted, and abridged.  Id.  The “liberty of speech” protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments is subject to regulation, but protected from “undue regulation.”  
Id. at 38. 
 101.  Id. at 65. 
 102.  Id. at 37.  Meiklejohn also noted: 
No one can possibly doubt or deny that congressional debate, on occasion, 
brings serious and immediate threat to the general welfare. . . .  On the floors of 
both houses, in time of peace as well as in war, national policies have been criti-
cized with an effectiveness which the words of private citizens could never 
achieve. 
Id. at 36. 
 103.  Id. at 25.  Meiklejohn famously analogized speech to a New England town meet-
ing.  Id. at 22–24.  Thomas I. Emerson, among others, has questioned the appropriateness 
of the analogy, based on the fact that it presupposes the existence of a moderator who is 
authorized to control the discussion in ways that would not be appropriate in other cir-
cumstances.  Emerson, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
 104.  MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 21, at 25.  Meiklejohn argued: 
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The point, Meiklejohn insisted, “is to give every voting member 
of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understand-
ing of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing soci-
ety must deal.”105  Education is essential, but so is information: 
“What . . . would be the use of giving to American citizens freedom to 
speak if they had nothing worth saying to say?”106  Indeed, all the edu-
cation in the world would not be enough if citizens lacked the specific 
information necessary for making informed judgments about matters 
of public importance. Thus, the question arises as to where such in-
formation will come from and how it will be acquired, particularly 
when the executive has a monopoly over it and does not wish to dis-
close it.107  In Meiklejohn’s view, a “right to know” is implicit in the 
First Amendment.108 
                                                          
And this means that though citizens may, on other grounds, be barred from 
speaking, they may not be barred because their views are thought to be false or 
dangerous. . . .  When men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—who 
must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. 
Id. at 26. 
 105.  Id. at 88. 
 106.  Id. at 102.  Meiklejohn also noted that “the protection of public discussion in our 
nation takes on an ever-increasing importance as the nation succeeds in so educating and 
informing its people that, in mind and will, they are able to think and act as self-governing 
citizens.”  Id. at 102–03. 
 107.  Some would suggest that Congress should shoulder this responsibility.  See Levi, 
supra note 24, at 331 (asserting that our system of government depends on Congress’s 
holding the executive to account, and that it is the responsibility of Congress, not individ-
uals or institutions of civil society, to secure from the executive the information necessary 
for Congress and the public to hold the executive accountable); Antonin Scalia, The Free-
dom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14, 19 [hereinafter Scalia, No 
Clothes] (asserting that it is for Congress to procure information from the executive, and 
ridiculing the idea that that the public can or should engage in that pursuit).  But Con-
gress is often unwilling or unable to perform that function.  In that respect, it is surely sig-
nificant that the first FOIA case decided by the Supreme Court was one brought by mem-
bers of Congress, who could not acquire the information they wanted through ordinary 
parliamentary means.  See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (involving a suit by members of 
Congress to obtain documents relating to an underground atomic explosion).  The 
George W. Bush administration regularly refused to comply with congressional requests 
for information.  Pozen, supra note 13, at 259.  The Obama Administration even invoked 
executive privilege to block the testimony of the White House social secretary regarding a 
breach of security at a state dinner.  Michael Scherer, No Testimony for Obama’s Social Secre-
tary?, TIME, Dec. 3, 2009,  available at www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,194519 
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In the mid-1970s, when the Supreme Court was being asked to 
infer from the First Amendment a governmental obligation to provide 
access to information within the government’s control, Thomas I. 
Emerson, one of the most influential First Amendment scholars of the 
time, took up Meiklejohn’s argument.109  Emerson addressed the 
                                                          
2,00.html.  Rodney Austin noted in 1985 that Congress had been a major beneficiary of 
FOIA. See Austin, supra note 7. at 365.  Parliamentarians in other countries have also used 
access-to-information provisions to secure information from the executive. See, e.g., HCLU 
v. Hungary, supra note 20, at 2; Claude Reyes, supra note 20, ¶ 48. 
 108.  Some later commentators have criticized Meiklejohn’s theoretical and historical 
understanding.  See, e.g., William Marshall, Free Speech and the Problem of Democracy (Book Re-
view), 89 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 196–98 (1994) (taking issue with Meiklejohn’s view concern-
ing the centrality of political participation and with the premise that political speech is “at 
the core of the First Amendment”); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy 
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111–14 (1993) (criticizing 
Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First Amendment).  On the other hand, John Courtney 
Murray, S.J., a contemporary who approached these issues from a Catholic perspective 
quite different from Meiklejohn’s, expressed views remarkably similar to his: 
[T]he proper premise of these freedoms [of speech and the press] lay in the fact 
that they were social necessities. . . .  They were regarded as conditions essential 
to the conduct of free, representative, and responsible government.  People who 
are called upon to obey have the right first to be heard.  People who are to bear 
burdens and make sacrifices have the right first to pronounce on the purposes 
which their sacrifices serve.  People who are summoned to contribute to the 
common good have the right first to pass their own judgment on the question, 
whether the good proposed be truly a good, the people’s good, the common 
good.  Through the technique of majority opinion this popular judgment be-
comes binding on government. 
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 34–35 (1960).  Like Maritain, Murray had a strong influence on 
the development of Catholic attitudes toward democracy in the mid-twentieth century.  
Although “silenced” by his religious superiors in the years preceding the Second Vatican 
Council, Murray, like Maritain, had a profound influence on the Council, which adopted 
many of his (and Maritain’s) ideas concerning democracy and individual freedom in key 
documents.  See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 155 (2005) (noting Murray’s silencing, re-
habilitation, and participation in the Council). 
 109.  See Emerson, supra note 21, at 4 (analyzing Mieklejohn’s theory of the First 
Amendment).  Emerson, however, parted company with Meiklejohn in several important 
respects.  For example, Emerson had little sympathy for Meiklejohn’s attempt to make 
“the right to know the sole touchstone in the interpretation of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”  
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question “whether the right to know can be effectively incorporated 
into our legal structure, through development of an adequate consti-
tutional theory and workable operating rules.”110  Like Meiklejohn, 
Emerson believed that “the right to know fits readily into the [F]irst 
[A]mendment and the whole system of freedom of expression.”111  
Indeed, Emerson believed that the most significant application of a 
constitutional right to know would come from the recognition of a 
right to obtain information from the government.  Here, Emerson 
agreed with Meiklejohn’s theory.112  According to Emerson: 
 [T]he greatest contribution that could be made in this 
whole realm of law would be explicit recognition by the 
courts that the constitutional right to know embraces the 
                                                          
Id.  Emerson thought that “the right to know serves much the same function in our society 
as the right to communicate.”  Id. at 2.  It aids self-fulfillment, the search for truth (or for 
better answers), collective decision-making in a democratic society, and relatively peaceful 
social change.  Id.  Emerson criticized Meiklejohn’s austere theory of the First Amendment 
on four grounds: 
[(1) it] neglects the function of the [F]irst [A]mendment in protecting the right 
of the speaker to personal self-fulfillment, [(2)] it is impossible to give absolute 
constitutional protection to the right to obtain information under all circum-
stances, [(3)] the dynamics of the system of freedom of expression rest on the 
assertion of individual rights by the person desiring to communicate, far more 
than on pressure from individuals desiring to listen, and [(4)] history, tradition, 
doctrine, and practice have all developed largely [in the opposite direction, that 
is,] on the basis of protecting the rights of the speaker. 
Id. at 4–5.  Emerson also rejected the validity of Meiklejohn’s analogy of free speech to the 
conduct of a New England town meeting, which is by nature a limited forum in which 
someone must allocate scarce resources, thereby “inject[ing] the government into deci-
sions on the content, political relevance, and worth of the speech, an area that is no busi-
ness of government in a free system.”  Id. at 5. 
 110.  Id. at 1.  According to Emerson, there are several practical “advantages to recog-
nizing the right to know as a legal right independent of, or perhaps supplemental to, the 
more traditional right of the speaker to communicate.”  Id. at 2.  Among other things, “the 
right to know focuses on the affirmative aspects of the . . . system of freedom of expression, 
as well as simply looking at the negative right to be free of government interferences.”  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 2.  Emerson described “two closely related features: First, the right to read, to 
listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications; and second, the right to obtain 
information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others.”  Id.  Although “the con-
tours of the right to know remain [admittedly] obscure,” Emerson emphasized that the 
Court had repeatedly acknowledged its existence.  Id. at 3. 
 112.  Id. at 14. 
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right of the public to obtain information from the govern-
ment.  There is a firm, indeed overwhelming, theoretical 
base for accepting this position. . . .  The public, as sover-
eign, must have all information available in order to instruct 
its servants, the government.  As a general proposition, if 
democracy is to work, there can be no holding back of in-
formation; otherwise ultimate decisionmaking by the peo-
ple, to whom that function is committed, becomes impossi-
ble.  Whether or not such a guarantee of the right to know is 
the sole purpose of the [F]irst [A]mendment, it is surely a 
main element of that provision and should be recognized as 
such.113 
Emerson recognized that a constitutional right to government in-
formation cannot be absolute, but he insisted that any “exceptions 
should be scrupulously limited to those that are absolutely essential to 
the effective operation of government institutions.”114  For example, 
he acknowledged “that some allowance would have to be granted for 
national security data, but only to the extent that tactical military 
movements, design of weapons, operation of espionage or counteres-
pionage, and similar matters are concerned.”115  Emerson also noted 
that working out the contours of the constitutional “right to know” 
through judicial procedures “would . . . be a long and tedious pro-
cess,” but suggested that, “a good start ha[d] already been made to 
achieve the same end through legislation,” namely, FOIA.116 
Emerson did not suggest, however, that legislation should take 
the place of a constitutional right.  Nor did he argue that the bounda-
ries of the constitutional right should be defined by legislation.  In-
                                                          
 113.  Id.  Emerson cited Justice Powell’s opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843, 872 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which Justice 
Powell observed “that the ‘underlying right’ is the ‘right of the public to the information 
needed to assert ultimate control over the political process,’” as well as Justice Douglas’s 
dissent in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974), in which he wrote that it was not 
the right of the journalists that was involved, “but rather the right of the people, the true 
sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in an informed manner.”  Emerson, 
supra note 21, at 15–16. 
 114.  Id. at 16–17. 
 115.  Id. at 17.  In addition, Emerson thought that some allowance should be made for 
diplomatic and collective bargaining negotiations, criminal investigations, and uncomplet-
ed litigation, and, where necessary, to ensure full and frank advice within the executive 
branch, and to protect personal privacy.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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deed, the opposite would appear to be the case inasmuch as it is the 
constitutional right to know that he thought was “entitled to support 
[from] legislation or other affirmative government action.”117  The 
adequacy of those statutory protections was to be measured against 
constitutional standards.118 
III.  THE PEOPLE’S ELUSIVE “RIGHT TO KNOW”: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND ITS CRITICS 
Supreme Court opinions have often mentioned the “right to 
know,” as well as the necessary connection between democratic self-
government and the free flow of information and ideas.119  This was 
particularly true during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in cases in 
which the Court wished to underscore the importance of a free press 
in a free society.  For example, Justice Brennan, echoing his earlier 
opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, observed in Garrison v. Loui-
siana,120 that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.”121  According to Jus-
tice Brennan, the First Amendment “protects the paramount public 
interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public 
officials, their servants.”122  In Time, Inc. v. Hill,123 Justice Brennan ob-
served that the freedom of the press is “not for the benefit of the 
press so much as for the benefit of all of us,” and that “[a] broadly de-
fined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political 
                                                          
 117.  Id. at 2. 
 118.  Emerson also addressed the leaking of information by current or former govern-
ment employees.  According to Emerson, leaks could be dealt with through criminal pros-
ecutions or disciplinary proceedings, but there should be no further efforts to restrict “cir-
culation of information which has escaped the government’s grasp.”  Id. at 18.  Additional 
efforts would stifle “all discussion or circulation of information about public affairs” and 
leave citizens “exclusively dependent on the bland handouts of government agencies.”  Id. 
 119.  David O’Brien noted in 1980 that the Justices had acknowledged a “right to know” 
in opinions filed in twenty-four cases between 1943 and 1980, with eleven of the cases be-
ing decided after 1970. O’Brien, supra note 25, at 619. 
 120.  379 U.S. 64 (1964); see also generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and 
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965) (discussing the 
importance of the limits that the First Amendment places on government regulation of 
expression). 
 121.  Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75. 
 122.  Id. at 77. 
 123.  385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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system and an open society.”124  In Mills v. Alabama,125 Justice Black 
likewise emphasized the media’s “important role in the discussion of 
public affairs.”126  In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,127 Justice Harlan 
noted that the “Founders . . . felt that a free press would advance . . . 
responsible government.”128  Finally, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC,129 Justice White stated that “‘speech concerning public affairs 
is . . .  the essence of self-government.’”130  Most important, Justice 
White observed that “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experi-
ences which is crucial here.  That right may not constitutionally be 
abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.”131 
But none of those cases involved either the publication of infor-
mation secured from the government without its consent or a de-
mand that the government make available information that it wished 
to keep secret.  This Part will discuss two Supreme Court cases that 
did address those issues: New York Times Co. v. United States, which in-
volved the former and was decided in 1971, and Houchins v. KQED, 
which involved the latter and was decided in 1978.  This Part will also 
discuss responses to the New York Times decision by Louis Henkin and 
Edward Levi, as well as two essays written shortly after the Houchins 
decision by Lillian BeVier and David O’Brien. 
In New York Times Co. v. United States,132 a deeply divided Court133 
held that the First Amendment precluded the issuance of an injunc-
                                                          
 124.  Id. at 389. 
 125.  384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
 126.  Id. at 219. 
 127.  388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 128.  Id. at 147 (citation omitted). 
 129.  395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 130.  Id. at 390 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)). 
 131.  Id.  Justice Souter struck a similar chord in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., when he not-
ed in dissent that “freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value of enhancing 
[public] discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently self-
governed.”  501 U.S. 663, 678 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 132.  The newspapers argued that they were entitled to publish the Pentagon Papers 
because of the people’s “right to know” what their government was doing.  Id. at 749.  The 
press would later rely on that argument to justify demands for special access to closed facil-
ities such as prisons and for the recognition of a right to shield confidential sources.  In 
cases like Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843 (1974), the Court acknowledged the press’s special role in serving “the paramount 
  
2012] FOIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 45 
tion to prohibit publication of the Pentagon Papers, which consisted 
of portions of a top-secret history commissioned by Secretary of De-
fense Robert F. McNamara and pertaining to United States-Vietnam 
relations from 1945 to 1967.134  The Times had received portions of 
the report from Daniel Ellsberg, a Rand Corporation defense ana-
lyst.135 
On June 12, 1971, the New York Times began publishing the Pen-
tagon Papers.136  On the following day, the Attorney General threat-
ened prosecution under the Espionage Act.137  On June 15, the gov-
                                                          
public interest in a free flow of information to the people,” but nonetheless held, over 
strong dissents, that the press had no greater rights than the general public.  Pell, 417 U.S. 
at 832-34 (citations omitted).  In his dissent in Saxbe, for example, Justice Powell empha-
sized that the democratic values embodied in the First Amendment require that public 
debate be informed as well as unfettered, and he noted that “official restraints on access to 
news sources . . . may so undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is both 
appropriate and necessary to require the government to justify such regulations in terms 
more compelling than discretionary authority and administrative convenience.”  Saxbe, 417 
U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 133.  The Court decided the case in a brief per curiam opinion.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  Each of the Justices (six in the majority, three in dissent) 
also filed a separate opinion.  Several Justices also joined the opinions of others.  Justice 
Black and Justice Douglas joined in each other’s opinions, as did Justices Stewart and 
White.  Id. at 714, 720, 727, 730.  Justices Brennan and Marshall did not join in anyone 
else’s opinion.  In dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote for himself, as did Justice Blackmun.  
Id. at 748, 759.  Both the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent.  Id. at 752.  The opinions reflect a variety of theories. 
 134.  United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1971), 
remanded by 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 135.  William R. Glendon, The Pentagon Papers—Victory for a Free Press, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1295, 1296 (1998); DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS 365–68, 372–75 (2002).  The Pentagon Papers, as published by the news 
media, constituted only a part of the overall report, which remained classified until 2011.  
The same material was later published in book form.  NEIL SHEEHAN ET AL., PENTAGON 
PAPERS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1971).  The full report is now availa-
ble on the website of the National Archives.  REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE VIETNAM TASK FORCE, http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/ (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
 136.  N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 326. 
 137.  Glendon, supra note 135, at 1296–97.  On the same day, the Times retained Alex-
ander Bickel, a Yale Law School professor, and Floyd Abrams, a New York practitioner, as 
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ernment moved for injunctive relief in federal district court in New 
York.138  When the Washington Post began publication on June 18, the 
government moved for an injunction against the Post in the federal 
district court for the District of Columbia.  Both courts granted tem-
porary injunctions and appeals followed.139  On June 23, the District 
of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of the Post, while the Second Cir-
cuit ordered a remand in the case against the Times.140  On the after-
noon of June 25, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and set the 
cases for oral argument on the following day,141 at which time briefs 
also were to be exchanged.142  On June 30—fifteen days after the fil-
ing of the Times case in the district court—the Supreme Court upheld 
the newspapers’ right to publish. 
In a Delphic per curiam opinion that masked many significant 
disagreements, the Court decided the case as narrowly, and with as lit-
tle explanation, as possible.  After noting that “[a]ny system of prior 
restraints . . . comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against 
its constitutional validity,” the Court observed that both trial courts 
and the District of Columbia Circuit had found that the government 
                                                          
counsel, because the newspaper’s regular attorneys had declined to act for the newspaper.  
Id. at 1296.  William R. Glendon represented the Post.  Id. at 1295 n.**. 
 138.  N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. at 326. 
 139.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 755 (1971) (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
 140.  Id. at 753. 
 141.  Id.  The Court was initially divided as to the proper course.  Four Justices appar-
ently wanted to allow publication without further ado, while four other Justices wanted to 
leave the injunctions in place and set the cases for argument in the fall.  Glendon, supra 
note 135, at 1298–99.  According to Glendon, Justice Stewart broke the deadlock by stating 
that he would vote for immediate publication unless the cases were heard without delay.  
Id. at 1298. 
 142.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Erwin Griswold, the former 
dean of Harvard Law School who served as President Nixon’s Solicitor General, com-
plained repeatedly during oral argument that the Court’s expedited briefing and argu-
ment schedule had not left him sufficient time to prepare the case—a point that the dis-
senting Justices would develop further in their opinions.  See Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not 
Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.  Alt-
hough it was not possible for Griswold to review all of the materials at issue in the case be-
fore the argument, he later did so.  Id.  Based on that review, he concluded there was noth-
ing in the Pentagon Papers that warranted their withholding. Id. 
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had failed to overcome that presumption.143  The Court simply stated: 
“We agree.”144 
Two members of the Court—Justices Black and Douglas—
thought that the First Amendment prohibited all prior restraints.145  
Justice Black stated: 
 In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the 
free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential 
role in our democracy.  The press was to serve the governed, 
not the governors.  The Government’s power to censor the 
press was abolished so that the press would remain forever 
free to censure the Government.  The press was protected so 
that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the 
people.146 
Justice Douglas likewise asserted that “[t]he dominant purpose of 
the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of gov-
ernmental suppression of embarrassing information.”147  He further 
observed that “[s]ecrecy in government is fundamentally anti-
democratic,” while “[o]pen debate and discussion of public issues are 
vital to our national health.”148 
Justice Brennan wrote separately.  He did not believe that prior 
restraints were categorically prohibited,149 but thought that the gov-
ernment’s case was insufficient because it was “predicated upon sur-
mise or conjecture” as to the possibility of “untoward consequences,” 
rather than “proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and im-
mediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the 
safety of a transport already at sea.”150 
Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall also concurred. Justice 
Stewart emphasized the importance of the First Amendment in view 
of the executive’s enormous power in foreign affairs and national de-
                                                          
 143.  N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 723–24 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 148.  Id. at 724. 
 149.  Id. at 725–26 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 150.  Id. at 725–27. 
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fense, which “ha[d] been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of 
the nuclear missile age.”151  Justice Stewart continued: 
 In the absence of the governmental checks and balances 
present in other areas of our national life, the only effective 
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of na-
tional defense and international affairs may lie in an en-
lightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opin-
ion which alone can here protect the values of democratic 
government.  For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press 
that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic pur-
pose of the First Amendment.152 
Justice White emphasized the government’s failure to meet the 
heavy burden of justifying a prior restraint.153  Finally, Justice Marshall 
thought that the case presented a separation of powers issue because 
the president was asking the courts to use their equity powers to pro-
tect the national interest and “to prevent behavior that Congress has 
specifically declined to prohibit.”154 
Each of the dissenting Justices wrote separately.155  Chief Justice 
Warren Burger did not reach the merits, but emphasized the “deriva-
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 152.  Id. at 728.  Justice Stewart thought that the government was required to show that 
“disclosure . . . will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Na-
tion or its people.”  Id. at 730.  Justice Stewart recognized that the president must strike the 
balance between public disclosure and secrecy, but he emphasized that “secrecy for its own 
sake” must be avoided.  Id. at 729.  He continued: “For when everything is classified, then 
nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the 
careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.”  Id. 
 153.  “At least in the absence of legislation,” Justice White could not accept the govern-
ment’s assertion that 
the President is entitled to an injunction against publication . . . whenever he 
can convince a court that [disclosure] threatens ‘grave and irreparable’ injury to 
the public interest, [without regard to] whether or not the material . . . is classi-
fied, whether or not publication would be lawful under relevant criminal stat-
utes . . . and regardless of the circumstances in which the newspaper [gained] 
possession of the information. 
Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring). 
 154.  Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 155.  Taking their cue from the Solicitor General, each of the dissenters decried the 
“undue haste” with which the case had been litigated.  Due to the way “in which the Times 
[had] proceeded from the date it obtained the purloined documents,” the Chief Justice 
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tive” nature of the newspapers’ claim based on the public’s “right to 
know”: 
 The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First 
Amendment; they denominate this right as the public “right 
to know”; by implication, the Times asserts a sole trusteeship 
of that right by virtue of its journalistic “scoop.”  The right is 
asserted as an absolute.  Of course, the First Amendment 
right itself is not an absolute . . . .  There are . . . excep-
tions. . . .  Conceivably such exceptions may be lurking in 
these cases and would have been flushed had they been 
properly considered in the trial courts, free from unwarrant-
ed deadlines and frenetic pressures.156 
Chief Justice Burger suggested that the Times, which had taken 
the time to review the documents carefully before publishing them, 
had shown little urgency in satisfying the public’s “right to know.”157  
The Chief Justice further observed: “After these months of deferral, 
the alleged ‘right to know’ has somehow and suddenly become a right 
that must be vindicated instanter.”158  He described the case as “a par-
ody of the judicial function.”159 
Justice Harlan would have affirmed in the Times case because the 
Second Circuit had not abused its discretion in holding that the gov-
ernment had not been given an adequate opportunity to prove its 
case.160  According to Justice Harlan, a “more fundamental reason” 
for ruling in favor of the government was “the [narrow] scope of the 
judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive 
                                                          
thought that the case had been litigated with an “unseemly,” “unjudicial,” and “frenetic 
haste.”  Id. at 748–49 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Harlan thought that the Court had 
been “almost irresponsibly feverish” in its handling of the cases, which presented issues “as 
important as any that ha[d] arisen during [his] time on the Court.”  Id. at 753, 755 (Har-
lan J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun pointed to the “hurried decision of profound consti-
tutional issues on inadequately developed and largely assumed facts without . . . [sufficient-
ly] careful deliberation.”  Id. at 760 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 156.  Id. at 749, 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 157.  Id. at 750. 
 158.  Id. There was no reason, the Chief Justice asserted, for now putting this pressure 
on “the . . . Government, from whom this information was illegally acquired . . . [or on] all 
the counsel, trial judges, and appellate judges.”  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 752. 
 160.  Id. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Branch . . . in the field of foreign affairs.”161  In his dissent, Justice 
Blackmun famously observed that “[t]he First Amendment, after all, is 
only one part of an entire Constitution.”162 
Shortly after the decision was announced, Louis Henkin, a prom-
inent scholar of foreign relations law, took issue with all the talk, 
“[b]oth before the courts and in the Press” about “‘the right of the 
people to know’ what government was up to.”163  No such right can be 
found in the constitutional text, Henkin noted, and the government, 
from its earliest days, “has asserted the right to conceal and, there-
fore, in practical effect not to let the people know.”164  Moreover, “in 
the law at least, the people’s right to know was derivative, the obverse 
of the right of the Press to publish, and coextensive with it.”165  Hen-
kin further noted that “any right of the people to know was not con-
                                                          
 161.  Id. at 756.  Justice Harlan thought the judicial role properly limited to 
[(1)] review[ing] the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying 
[the Court] that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper 
compass of the President’s foreign relations power, [and (2)] insist[ing] that the 
determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the 
national security be made by the head of the Executive Department concerned—
here the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense—after actual personal 
consideration by that officer. 
Id. at 757.  In Justice Harlan’s view, these inquiries were constitutionally necessary to avoid 
“a complete abandonment of judicial control,” but the courts could “not properly go [fur-
ther] and redetermine . . . the probable impact of disclosure on the national security.”  Id. 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162.  Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun also suggested the need 
for a weighing, “upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to 
print and of the very narrow right of the Government to prevent,” but he observed that 
“[s]uch standards are not yet developed.”  Id. 
 163.  Henkin, supra note 24, at 273.  Henkin conceded that the phrase “might have ap-
pealed to the authors of the Declaration of Independence and even to Constitutional Fa-
thers,” but emphasized that “the Constitution . . . expressed no such right, if only because 
the . . . Framers were committed to minimal, ‘watch dog’ government, and saw rights as 
‘retained by the people’ to be safeguarded against infringement by government . . . [and] 
did not declare obligations by the government to the people or declare rights of the peo-
ple that government was obliged affirmatively to effectuate.”  Id.; see also generally David P. 
Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986) (discussing 
the distinction between “positive rights” and “negative rights,”  and the extent to which the 
United States Constitution may or may not protect the former). 
 164.  Henkin, supra note 24, at 273. 
 165.  Id. 
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sidered violated if government maintained secrecy in some matters; it 
was assumed, no doubt, that the people agreed it should not know 
what could not be told it without damage to the public interest.”166  
Although government secrecy may have been accepted only as “a nec-
essary evil,”167 the tendency of “mammoth, complex government” to 
withhold “more and for longer than it has to” has been understood as 
a political problem, and not as a constitutional issue for the courts to 
decide.168 
Henkin did not believe that the New York Times decision altered 
any of these assumptions.  Indeed, he argued that “[t]he [only] ques-
tion raised . . . was whether publication by the Press is different.”169  
Henkin recognized that the “Government has a monopoly of . . . im-
portant information and it could effectively curtail the freedom of the 
Press . . . by withholding that information, or distort the function of 
the Press by selective ‘hand out,’”170 but he noted that, “[e]ven as to 
the Press, [no one has] claimed that the Government was constitu-
tionally obliged to tell the Press everything, or anything.”171  Nor, he 
wrote, did anyone doubt the government’s right to enact harsh secre-
cy laws to deter leaks.172 
Nonetheless, Henkin was critical of the Court’s decision.  First, 
he argued that permitting the executive to conceal information, while 
permitting the press to try and discover it, encouraged a “trial by bat-
tle and cleverness” that could not guarantee either the secrecy of that 
which should remain secret or the disclosure of that which should be 
disclosed.173  Second, he found the Court’s faith in judicial balancing 
                                                          
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 275. 
 168.  Id. at 275–76.  Henkin noted that Congress had enacted legislation to create cer-
tain governmental restraints, and citizen rights, in this area.  Id. at 276.  Henkin recog-
nized, however, that statutes such as FOIA “do not begin to reach the problem of ‘over-
concealment’ by mammoth, complex government.”  Id.  The political problem involved a 
lack of popular trust in government, which would not be solved, Henkin thought, “[u]ntil 
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tunately, that “hard face” has yet to be turned.  See Goitein & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 21–
32 (addressing the ongoing failure of the political branches to address the problem of 
overclassification in an effective way). 
 169.  Henkin, supra note 24, at 276. 
 170.  Id. at 277. 
 171.  Id. at 276. 
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misplaced because courts cannot weigh factors such as the govern-
ment’s need to conceal, the press’s need to publish, and the people’s 
need to know.174  According to Henkin, the result of judicial review 
would continue to be over-concealment, but with judicial approval.175  
Acknowledging the reality, in some sense, of the “right to know,” 
Henkin sounded a somber note: “The unhappy game of trial by clev-
erness . . . with an infrequent journalistic success will do little to sup-
port the people’s right to know when Government abuses its respon-
sibility to withhold.”176 
In 1974, President Nixon resigned in disgrace after a unanimous 
Supreme Court upheld a district court order requiring him to pro-
duce tapes and records thought to constitute evidence of crime.177  
Nixon had asserted his entitlement to “an absolute, unqualified Presi-
dential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circum-
                                                          
 174.  Id. at 278–79.  Henkin also found the Court’s reliance on the “prior injunction” 
doctrine unpersuasive because “stiff penalties” are as effective “as any injunction.”  Id. at 
278. 
 175.  Id. at 279.  Justice Jackson made a similar point in Korematsu v. United States, where 
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experience with classified material that there is massive overclassification and that the 
principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with govern-
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 177.   See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President Nixon to turn 
over tapes for review); WATERGATE: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 190–99 (Stanley I. 
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Decision 2000/America Waits: Calls for Recusal of Thomas, Scalia, Are Undue, Experts Say, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at 25. 
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stances.”178  Indeed, his lawyer apparently told the Court that “[t]he 
president want[ed him] to argue that [the president] is as powerful a 
monarch as Louis XIV, only for four years at a time, and is not subject 
to the processes of any court in the land except the court of im-
peachment.”179 
In 1975, writing in the aftermath of Watergate, a new Attorney 
General, Edward H. Levi, lamented that “the very concept of confi-
dentiality in government has been increasingly challenged as contrary 
to our democratic ideals, to the constitutional guarantees of freedom 
of expression and freedom of the press, and to our structure of gov-
ernment.”180  In addition, according to Levi, any limitation on disclo-
sure was treated as an unjustifiable “abridgment of the people’s right 
to know,” and was thought by many to “serve[] no purpose other than 
to shield improper or unlawful action from public scrutiny.”181 
While insisting on the need for confidentiality in government, 
particularly concerning foreign and military affairs,182 Levi also rec-
ognized the claims of representative democracy.  Invoking Mei-
klejohn, Levi wrote: 
[T]he First Amendment is thus an integral part of the plan 
for intelligent self-government.  But it is equally clear that it 
is not enough that people be able to discuss issues freely.  
They must also have access to the information required to 
resolve the issues correctly.  Thus, basic to the theory of de-
mocracy is the right of the people to know about the opera-
tion of their government.183 
Levi saw these competing claims as a conflict of values, the resolution 
of which necessarily required a precise account of the nature of citi-
zenship.  For Levi, the people’s faith in government—in the reality of 
                                                          
 178.  Id. at 706; see also PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 34–52 
(1978) (discussing the Watergate scandal as a problem caused by an aggrandizement of 
executive power and an erosion of the separation of powers). 
 179.  CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: SECRET GOVERNMENT, WAR 
CRIMES, AND THE RULE OF LAW 245 (2009) (citation omitted).  Stanley I. Kutler has com-
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WATERGATE: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, supra note 177. 
 180.  Levi, supra note 24, at 323. 
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 182.  Id. at 328–31. 
 183.  Id. at 326 (footnote omitted). 
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effective representation and working representative institutions—was 
critical: 
[N]either the concept of democracy nor the First Amend-
ment confer on each citizen an unbridled power to demand 
access to all the information within the government’s posses-
sion.  The people’s right to know cannot mean that every 
individual or interest group may compel disclosure of the 
papers and effects of government officials whenever they 
bear on public business.  Under our Constitution, the peo-
ple are the sovereign, but they do not govern by the random 
and self-selective interposition of private citizens.  Rather, 
ours is a representative democracy . . . and our government 
is an expression of the collective will of the people.  The 
concept of democracy and the principle of majority rule re-
quire a special role of the government in determining the 
public interest.  The government must be accountable, so it 
must be given the means, including some confidentiality, to 
discharge its responsibilities.184 
It was important to Levi, therefore, that questions of disclosure 
be left to the political branches.  “For the most part,” Levi argued, “we 
have entrusted to each branch of government the decision as to 
whether, and under what circumstances, information properly within 
its possession should be disclosed to the other branches and to the 
public.”185  Conflicts were to be resolved by “political persuasion and 
accommodation,” with “each branch [acting] in a responsible fashion 
[and] the people [serving] as the ultimate judge.”186  Notwithstanding 
the enactment of FOIA, Levi suggested, these matters were to be left 
principally to the people’s representatives, and not to the people 
themselves.187 
In 1978, seven years after the Pentagon Papers decision, a deeply 
fractured seven-member Court decided Houchins v. KQED, which up-
held the Alameda County Sheriff’s decision to provide the press with 
the same access to jail facilities that was provided to the general pub-
lic, that is, the possibility of inclusion in a monthly tour of the jail, lim-
ited to twenty-five persons who were prohibited from visiting certain 
parts of the jail, from bringing cameras or tape recorders, and from 
                                                          
 184.  Id. at 327–28. 
 185.  Id. at 332. 
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interviewing prisoners.188  Chief Justice Burger wrote for himself, Jus-
tice White, and Justice Rehnquist.189  Justice Stewart concurred in the 
judgment, but not in the Chief Justice’s opinion.190  Justice Stevens 
dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Pow-
ell.191  Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in the deci-
sion.192 
Chief Justice Burger was unequivocal in his rejection of the 
press’s argument.  In a tone reminiscent of his opinion in New York 
Times Co. v. United States, the Chief Justice warned that “[t]he media 
are not a substitute for or an adjunct of government,” and that, “[w]e 
must not confuse the role of the media with that of government; each 
has special, crucial functions, each complementing—and sometimes 
conflicting with—the other.”193  Significantly, he interpreted the 
Court’s prior jurisprudence as confirming that freedom of the press is 
only “the freedom . . . to communicate information once it is obtained; 
[no precedent] compels the government to provide the media with in-
formation or access to it on demand.”194  The Chief Justice added: 
“There is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or 
for standards governing disclosure of or access to information,”195 and 
recognizing such a right would involve the Court in “a legislative task 
which the Constitution has left to the political processes.”196 
                                                          
 188.  Id. at 3–6.  The district court had entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting 
the Sheriff from denying respondents reasonable access to the jail, from preventing the 
use of photographic and sound recording equipment, and from prohibiting inmate inter-
views. Id. at 6–7. 
 189.  Id. at 3. 
 190.  Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 191.  Id. at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 193.  Id. at 8–9. 
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Justice Stewart agreed that “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information 
generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the 
press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally.  
The Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press 
equal access once government has opened its doors.”197  But he part-
ed company with the Chief Justice on the meaning of “equal ac-
cess.”198  According to Justice Stewart, equal access does not mean 
“access that is identical in all respects.”199  Instead, “[t]he Constitution 
requires sensitivity to [the media’s critical] role, and to the special 
needs of the press in performing it effectively.”200  Justice Stewart fur-
ther observed: “In short, terms of access that are reasonably imposed 
on individual members of the public may, if they impede effective re-
porting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to 
journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the visi-
tors see.”201  Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment because he be-
lieved that the preliminary injunction affirmed by the court of appeals 
was overly broad, but he also thought that some form of injunction 
might be appropriate on remand.202 
Justice Stevens began his dissent with an account of the condi-
tions at the jail, which a federal court previously had found to be 
“‘shocking and debasing [and constituting] cruel and unusual pun-
ishment for man or beast as a matter of law.’”203  After visiting the fa-
cility, the federal court “reached the ‘inescapable conclusion . . . that 
[part of the jail] should be razed to the ground.’”204  Notwithstanding 
a suicide and illnesses that a (subsequently fired) prison psychiatrist 
attributed to conditions at the jail, the news media, “[e]xcept for a 
carefully supervised tour in 1972 . . . were completely excluded from 
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 197.  Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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the inner portions of the . . . jail until after [the lawsuit] was com-
menced.”205 
Justice Stevens also took a different view of the issue presented: 
“[T]he unconstitutionality of [the] policies which gave rise to this liti-
gation does not rest on the premise that the press has a greater right 
of access to information regarding prison conditions than do other 
members of the public.”206  Justice Stevens observed that the Sheriff 
had “enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion of both the public 
and the press from those areas within the . . . jail where the inmates 
were confined,” as well as “a policy of reading all inmate correspond-
ence addressed to persons other than lawyers and judges and censor-
ing those portions that related to the conduct of the guards who con-
trolled their daily existence.”207  Although acknowledging that the 
Court’s jurisprudence established that there is no “‘unrestrained right 
to gather information,’” Justice Stevens noted that “the Court has 
never intimated that a nondiscriminatory policy of excluding entirely 
both the public and the press from access to information about prison 
conditions would avoid constitutional scrutiny.”208 
Invoking Madison and Meiklejohn, as well as the Court’s prior 
cases, Justice Stevens argued that the First Amendment, in addition to 
protecting the rights of individual speakers and listeners, “serves [the] 
essential societal function”209 of protecting “the free flow of infor-
mation to the public,”210 with a view toward ensuring that public de-
bate is “‘informed’” as well as “‘unfettered.’”211  Significantly, Justice 
Stevens observed: 
 It is not sufficient . . . that the channels of communication 
be free of governmental restraints.  Without some protection 
for the acquisition of information about the operation of 
public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the 
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process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers 
would be stripped of its substance.212 
As a general matter, Justice Stevens had no quarrel with the need 
for confidentiality in government or with the ordinary primacy of the 
political branches in making decisions about disclosure.213  But the ul-
timate responsibility for managing prisons rests with the citizenry, and 
here, as Justice Stevens pointed out, a federal court had found that 
the conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.214  
Whether those conditions persisted was clearly a matter of public 
concern, and it was critical for “a democratic community [to have] 
access to knowledge about how its servants were treating some of its 
members who have been committed to their custody.”215  Justice Ste-
vens concluded: “An official prison policy of concealing such 
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of infor-
mation at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .”216 
In 1980, two years after the Houchins decision, Lillian BeVier and 
David O’Brien each published articles critical of the “right to know.”  
Although there were important differences between them, both 
commentators saw the world, and the proper role of the courts, very 
differently from Justice Stevens. 
BeVier emphasized the distinction between democratic and rep-
resentative forms of government, and the fact that the American gov-
ernment is a representative government, not a democracy.217  She 
echoed Levi in that regard, but also made a more direct challenge to 
Meiklejohn’s conception of citizenship.  Because the people delegate 
most decisions to their representatives, BeVier argued, Meiklejohn 
was wrong to read the Constitution to mean that “‘public issues shall 
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U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring), that “[i]t would be a barren marketplace 
of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers,” Justice Stevens observed that it would be “an 
even more barren marketplace that had willing buyers and sellers and no meaningful in-
formation to exchange.”  Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 213.  Id. at 34–35. 
 214.  Id. at 37 n.33. 
 215.  Id. at 38. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  BeVier, supra note 24, at 501–06. 
  
2012] FOIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 59 
be decided by universal suffrage.’”218  According to BeVier, “the dem-
ocratic processes embodied in the Constitution prescribe a consider-
ably more attenuated role for citizens.”219  Thus, “it is surely more ac-
curate to [say] that public issues shall be decided by representatives of 
the people who shall be elected by universal suffrage.”220  Ultimate sov-
ereignty may rest with the people, BeVier argued, but “[t]he Constitu-
tion envisions . . . a system in which the citizens do not directly . . . 
make or implement public decisions,” but “retain their authority to 
choose the direction of governmental policy” through the election of 
representatives.221 
Although citizens monitor their representatives, they generally 
do so at a distance.  According to BeVier, the principal activity of citi-
zens is the casting of votes at periodic elections, presumably based on 
their evaluations of the candidates’ promises and records with respect 
to a vast and diverse array of subjects, and on predictions about the 
candidates’ likely future actions.222  Even when a strong majority pro-
foundly disagrees with their government’s present policies, they can-
not normally take any immediate, authoritative action with respect to 
those policies.  As opposed to a pure democracy, in which everyone 
must decide and vote on everything, citizens in a representative de-
mocracy have fewer decisions to make, and much less need for de-
tailed or instantaneous information about the workings of govern-
ment.223  Most important, BeVier insisted, the First Amendment 
guarantees freedom of speech, not the right to engage in well-informed 
speech.224  According to BeVier, and contrary to the views expressed 
by Justice Stevens in Houchins, the government has no obligation to 
afford access to information or to remove obstacles to the gathering 
and dissemination of information.225  The extent of access to govern-
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ment information, like other issues, is simply a matter for the people’s 
representatives to decide.226 
BeVier’s view is too facile a rejoinder.  Meiklejohn may have 
overstated the point, but BeVier’s view comes close to reducing citi-
zenship “‘to obey[ing] law and perhaps, in periodic elections, to con-
firm[ing] the choice of leaders whose election gives them the power 
to enact into law whatever policies they see fit.’”227  Meiklejohn is sure-
ly correct that citizenship in a representative democracy must allow 
for—indeed, requires—a more active participation in government.  
The American founders may not have wanted the people’s control of 
the government to be direct or absolute, but neither did they con-
template a system of government in which the people had little need 
for information because they lacked an effective voice in directing the 
affairs of government.  Moreover, our constitutional system, as it has 
evolved through numerous amendments and judicial decisions, has 
become far more democratic than the system contemplated by some 
of the founding generation, and the role of the citizen has expanded 
accordingly.  Of course, the obstacles to fulfilling that role also have 
increased, but that should not detract from the fact that the gover-
nors are not meant to have unquestioned authority in our system of 
government, and citizens are not meant to be silent passengers.  In 
our system of representative democracy, meaningful access to gov-
ernment information is critical, both to effective citizen participation 
and to the proper accountability of officials responsible for policy-
making and administration.228 
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In his 1980 article, David O’Brien observed that the “‘right to 
know’ ha[d] become an increasingly popular political ideal in Ameri-
ca,” but that the Burger Court was “particularly unsympathetic to 
claims that the First Amendment either specifically guarantees a ‘right 
to know’ or grants the press special privileges in order to inform the 
public.”229  In O’Brien’s view, however, the Burger Court’s stance was 
“an occasion for celebration, not condemnation,” because recogni-
tion of a “directly enforceable”230 constitutional “right to know” would 
“raise[] fundamental issues about the nature and limits of constitu-
tional interpretation and about the role of judicial review in a consti-
tutional democracy.”231  In addition, the recognition of such a right, 
according to O’Brien, would seem “inconsistent with the First 
Amendment and the Founding Fathers’ understanding of the need 
for a delicate balance between egalitarian demands for an informed 
populace . . . and efficient decision-making by government offi-
cials.”232  Moreover, the practical problems in determining the scope 
of an enforceable “right to know” ought to “admonish scholars and 
the Supreme Court against further attempts to articulate” such a 
right.233  At the same time, O’Brien emphasized that the First 
Amendment is “crucial . . . because the electorate must be able to in-
form its representatives concerning issues of public moment [and] be 
informed by critical appraisals of official activity and the operations of 
government.”234 
O’Brien was unequivocal in rejecting the idea that the First 
Amendment encompassed an actionable right to know, but he made 
clear that a substantial part of his concern was with individual en-
forceability, and with the role that courts necessarily would play in the 
enforcement of such a right, rather than with the “right” itself.  Thus, 
he did not rule out the possibility that such a “right” might be given 
effect in other ways: 
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[I]f the public’s “right to know” is in any sense a constitu-
tional right, it must be an abstract right justifiable in terms 
of both the general principles of constitutionally limited 
government and the specific guarantees of the First 
Amendment.  As an abstract right, the political ideal of the 
public’s “right to know” at once underscores and gains sig-
nificance from the enumerated guarantees of freedom of 
speech and of the press, but does not mandate a concrete 
“right to know” which is directly enforceable against the 
government.235 
Thus, even if O’Brien were justified in rejecting the “right to know” as 
an individually enforceable right, that would not make it a dead letter.  
There is other work for it to do. 
There are many structural aspects of the Constitution that do not 
create individually enforceable rights but nonetheless protect liber-
ty.236  The diffusion of governmental power, effectuated through the 
institution of federalism and the separation of powers,237 is a funda-
mental aspect of the Constitution that could be described in this way.  
The duty of both Houses of Congress to keep journals of their pro-
ceedings is another structural feature that benefits the governed.238  
So too, at least indirectly, is the requirement that the president peri-
odically provide Congress with an account of the State of the Un-
ion.239 
Less obvious, perhaps, is the possibility that certain “rights” may 
play a constitutive role in the proper functioning of government, and 
that they should therefore be evaluated on that basis.  The Speech 
and Debate Clause, for example, confers a special benefit on legisla-
tors, but its central purpose is to benefit the process of government.240  
Meiklejohn saw the First Amendment in the same way: it was not justi-
fied by reference to the values of individual self-expression or self-
                                                          
 235.  Id. at 588. 
 236.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 578–80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
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realization, but by the public necessity of informed discussion about 
matters of public concern.241  O’Brien embraced this aspect of Mei-
klejohn’s theory, viewing the First Amendment as “concerned, not 
with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental respon-
sibility.”242  For O’Brien, it established “a regulatory principle,” not an 
individual right.243 
Taking O’Brien at his word, therefore, it seems clear that the 
“right to know,” even if it is not an individually actionable right, has 
an important role to play as a background or structural value implicit 
in the First Amendment and must be recognized, at the very least, as 
being essential to the life of a democratic society.  Indeed, O’Brien 
argued: 
To comprehend the important truth of Justice Stewart’s ob-
servation that “[t]he public’s interest in knowing about its 
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, 
but the protection is indirect,” is both to appreciate the pub-
lic’s “right to know” as a political ideal and to understand 
the illegitimacy of a directly enforceable constitutional “right 
to know.”244 
One important and obvious use for this “political ideal” might be 
to provide a framework for interpreting FOIA.  Interestingly, alt-
hough O’Brien was writing fourteen years after the enactment of 
FOIA, he did not mention the statute until the final paragraph of his 
article, and then only in the context of a further admonition that the 
Court should not recognize the validity of an individually enforceable 
constitutional “right to know.”245  O’Brien stated: “In the last decade, 
major legislation designed to ensure governmental openness and to 
vindicate the public’s ‘right to know’ has been enacted.  These im-
portant policy developments, however, do not legitimate claims of a 
constitutional ‘right to know.’”246 
In a sense, however, they clearly do.  There can be no doubt that 
FOIA was enacted for the purpose of giving effect to the values em-
bodied in O’Brien’s abstract “right to know,” and, indeed, to give ef-
                                                          
 241.  Meiklejohn, Absolute, supra note 21, at 255. 
 242.  O’Brien, supra note 25, at 615 (quoting Meiklejohn, Absolute, supra note 21, at 
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fect to the vision of citizenship expressed by Madison in the 1790s and 
made incarnate through two centuries of constitutional amendment 
and interpretation.  Nor can there be any doubt that the Act is reme-
dial legislation in a profound sense.  At the time FOIA was enacted, its 
primary objective was to unlock government secrets and open up 
channels of information.  Justice Stewart might well have been de-
scribing the significance of the Act when he noted, in New York Times 
Co. v. United States, the need to counter the “enormous power” of the 
executive, which has been “pressed to the very hilt since the advent of 
the nuclear age.”247  As Justice Stewart further noted, 
 In the absence of the governmental checks and balances 
present in other areas of our national life, the only effective 
restraint upon executive policy and power [in the areas of 
national defense and international affairs] may lie in an en-
lightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opin-
ion which alone can here protect the values of a democratic 
government.248 
Justice Stevens made a similar point in Houchins, when he em-
phasized that the representative government contemplated by the 
founders requires that public debates and discussions be “informed” 
as well as “unfettered,” and that there must be “some protection for 
the acquisition of information about the operation of public institu-
tions,” lest “the process of self-governance . . . be stripped of its sub-
stance.”249  The concerns expressed by Justice Stewart and Justice Ste-
vens were the same concerns that gave birth to FOIA, which clearly 
was intended to mark a fundamental change in the structure and op-
eration of government, insofar as the relationship of the people to 
their elected officials was concerned. 
The Act is a special kind of statute.  One might say that it is 
foundational, or “quasi-constitutional,” or a “super-statute,” to use the 
terminology of William Eskridge and John Ferejohn.250  As Eskridge 
and Ferejohn have pointed out: 
 Not all statutes are created equal.  Appropriations laws 
perform important public functions, but they are usually 
short-sighted and have little effect on the law beyond the 
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years for which they apportion public monies.  Most substan-
tive statutes adopted by Congress and state legislatures reveal 
little more ambition: they cover narrow subject areas or rep-
resent legislative compromises that are short-term fixes to 
bigger problems and cannot easily be defended as the best 
policy result that can be achieved. Some statutes reveal am-
bition but do not penetrate deeply into American norms or 
institutional practice.  Even fewer statutes successfully pene-
trate public normative and institutional culture in a deep 
way.  These last are what we call super-statutes.251 
According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 
 A super-statute is a law . . . that (1) seeks to establish a new 
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) 
over time does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the 
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles 
have a broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond 
the four corners of the statute.  Super-statutes are typically 
enacted only after lengthy normative debate about a vexing 
social or economic problem . . . .  The law must also prove 
robust as a solution . . . over time, such that its earlier critics 
are discredited and its policy and principles become axio-
matic for the public culture.252 
Given their foundational nature, such statutes should be ap-
proached with special respect by all three branches of government: 
the judicial branch should interpret them by giving effect to their 
broad purposes, the executive branch should not disregard them, and 
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the legislative branch should be reluctant to amend them; it certainly 
should not do so without meaningful debate or in the middle of the 
night.  Nor should the legislative branch alter such super-statutes by 
attaching amendments to defense appropriation bills.253 
The Act clearly meets these criteria. In enacting FOIA, Congress 
sought to protect the people’s “right to know,” which had been 
acknowledged in countless Supreme Court cases, but had not been 
found to give rise to an individually enforceable right.254  Congress 
sought to establish an institutional framework for government trans-
parency through broad public access to government records.  The 
legislation “stuck” in public culture, having a broad effect on the de-
velopment of the law at the national and state levels, as well as in the 
many other countries that have adopted similar laws.  In a very pro-
found way, FOIA altered the relationship of the people to their gov-
ernment. 
Contrary to dicta in some Supreme Court opinions, the objective 
of FOIA was not to balance the need for disclosure with the need for 
secrecy.255  The objective of the Act was to require disclosure, except 
in those cases in which the government could make a compelling case 
that the requested information was exempt from disclosure under 
one of the statute’s specific exemptions.  At the time FOIA was enact-
ed, there was no shortage of government secrecy; it was disclosure 
that was in short supply. The central purpose of FOIA was to remedi-
ate that imbalance, and that purpose should be given effect by all 
three branches of government. 
O’Brien might balk at these conclusions. After all, one of his 
principal concerns was with the fact that recognizing a directly en-
forceable “right to know” would allow decisions about the disclosure 
of government information to be made by judges, rather than by ex-
ecutive branch officials, and that the implementation of that right 
would present intractable practical problems.256  But Congress, in en-
acting FOIA, already had determined that such decisions must be 
made, and that judges must have a key role in making them. Of 
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course, judges are not meant by FOIA to decide whether the world 
would be a better place if the requested information were disclosed; 
they can only decide whether the government has made a sufficient 
showing to satisfy one or more of the FOIA exemptions.  But the atti-
tudes with which judges approach those questions may be critically 
important. 
IV.  CONSTRUING FOIA: “THE FULLEST RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE” 
Among the factors that influence judicial decisions are the more 
or less tacit underlying assumptions of legal culture that guide the way 
in which arguments are made and cases are decided.257  Because 
FOIA was intended to be transformative, it presented a challenge to 
certain basic assumptions concerning the nature of the American 
constitutional order.  Justice Scalia, in a 1982 essay, touched on three 
of them: (1) the understanding that a representative government can 
                                                          
 257.  Judge Learned Hand wrote that, in constitutional cases, “everything turns upon 
the spirit in which [the judge] approaches the questions before him.”  Learned Hand, 
Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1930).  “Men do not gather figs of thistles,” he 
said, “nor supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited by parish or class.”  Id. 
at 12–13.  Similarly, Justice Jackson observed that, in some cases, “a judge is likely to leave 
by the same door through which he enter[ed].”  Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 49 
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Justice Jackson continued: “As we have been told by a 
master of our craft, ‘Some theory of liability, some philosophy of the end to be served by 
tightening or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at the root of any decision in 
novel situations when analogies are equivocal and precedents are silent.’”  Id. (quoting 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 102 (1924)).  In many cases, the result 
may be determined by the judge’s choice of interpretive strategy, but that choice may or 
may not have been the subject of conscious decision-making.  See, e.g., James Bradley 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
129, 140 (1893) (advocating deference except where a statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 3 (1985) (arguing that constitutional interpretation 
should be guided by the understanding that human dignity is the core constitutional val-
ue); ANTONIN J. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
16–18 (1998) (advocating originalist theory of constitutional interpretation); AHARON 
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY xiv, 3-19, 124 (2006) (advocating purposive theory of 
interpretation).  Likewise, a judge’s strong belief that the judiciary has only a minor role to 
play in a representative government is likely to influence the attitude with which he ap-
proaches a case challenging the constitutionality of legislative or executive action.  See H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL 
DECISION 9 (2008) (discussing judges’ views of judicial review). 
  
68 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
be counted on to tell the people what they really need to know, (2) 
that such disclosures of information are produced through the tug-
and-pull of inter-branch conflict, rather than through the efforts of 
the press or the public, and (3) that anything arguably or remotely re-
lated to foreign affairs or national security is unsuitable for judicial 
consideration.258 
Justice Scalia thought FOIA seriously defective, but despaired of 
curing those defects “as long as we are dominated by the obsession 
that gave them birth—that the first line of defense against an arbitrary 
executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and its surrogate, the 
press.”259  The effectiveness of such oversight is “a romantic notion,”260 
he argued, as indicated by the fact that “[t]he major exposés of recent 
times . . . owe virtually nothing to the FOIA [and] are primarily the 
product of the institutionalized checks and balances within our system 
of representative democracy.”261  Likewise, Justice Scalia found unten-
able the idea that courts should review executive branch determina-
tions relating to foreign affairs: 
What is needful for our national defense and what will im-
pair the conduct of our foreign affairs are questions of the 
sort that the courts will avoid—on the basis of the “political 
question” doctrine—even when they arise in the context of 
the most significant civil and criminal litigation.  Imagine 
pushing the courts into such inquiries for the purpose of 
ruling on an FOIA request!262 
A “mere” FOIA request, Justice Scalia might have said. 
Justice Scalia’s views are not idiosyncratic.  The idea that the 
people should be seen and not heard, that they need less than the 
fullest information, and that they can trust their elected representa-
tives to decide exactly what and how much information they need, as 
well as when they need it, is an idea with a long pedigree.263  Similarly, 
the idea that the courts should steer clear of matters that the govern-
ment claims to be related in some way to national security or foreign 
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affairs is not a new one.  In Hirabayashi v. United States264 and Korematsu 
v. United States,265 for example, the Supreme Court famously upheld 
the constitutionality of a curfew and the evacuation of Japanese-
Americans during World War II because the Court was convinced by 
military authorities who argued that it was impossible to segregate the 
loyal from the disloyal.266  If such operational decisions could not be 
tested in any way, perhaps decisions relating to access to information 
should also be immune from review.  It was not long before the new 
paradigm embodied by FOIA encountered the headwinds that these 
two objections represented.  How FOIA would fare depended in large 
part on whether the courts perceived it to be propelled by the First 
Amendment or simply flying on its own power. 
There are two points to be made about the FOIA jurisprudence.  
First, the cases reflect, at best, a general uneasiness or ambivalence 
about the purpose and place of the Act in a representative govern-
ment (Levi’s position), or, at worst, an outright hostility to the possi-
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bility that access to executive information should be deemed anything 
but a matter for discretionary decision by executive branch officials 
(BeVier’s and Scalia’s position).  Second, the FOIA jurisprudence re-
lating to national security in particular demonstrates a strong inclina-
tion to defer to executive assertions in such matters and an extreme 
reluctance to test the truth of those assertions.  Neither attitude is 
consistent with a proper understanding of FOIA or the constitutional 
“right to know.” 
The Act has been amended many times, and for diverse purpos-
es, since its  enactment in 1966.  At the beginning, Congress clearly 
echoed the thoughts of Emerson and Meiklejohn, emphasizing that 
the “right to know” is inherent in the “right to speak” and “the right 
to print,” and that a well-informed electorate is necessary for a repre-
sentative government.267  Congress’s purpose was clearly remedial.  
House and Senate Reports insisted that existing law—Section 3, the 
public information section of the Administrative Procedure Act268—
had been “of little or no value to the public in gaining access to rec-
ords of the Federal Government”; it permitted “any Government offi-
cial [to] withhold almost anything from any citizen under [its] vague 
standards—or, more precisely, lack of standards.”269  Section 3, the 
House and Senate Reports reiterated, “gave the agencies broad and 
effectively unreviewable discretion to determine whether information 
should be withheld ‘for good cause’ or ‘in the public interest,’ [which 
they used] ‘[i]nnumerable times . . . to cover up embarrassing mis-
takes or irregularities.’”270  Indeed, Congress believed that Section 3 
had proved to be “more . . . a withholding statute than a disclosure 
statute.”271 
Congress also recognized that government cannot be conducted 
in the round, and that some matters must be exempt, but it insisted 
that those exemptions were to be clearly stated and narrowly con-
strued.272  In the words of the Senate Report, the point of FOIA was to 
enable the public to “readily . . . gain access to the information neces-
sary to deal effectively and upon equal footing with Federal agencies,” 
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which required “the fullest responsible disclosure.”273  In broader 
terms, Congress’s purpose in enacting FOIA was to substitute a pre-
sumption of transparency for an existing presumption of secrecy.  In a 
very profound way, Congress sought to alter the relationship of the 
governors to the governed. 
The courts, on the other hand, gave FOIA a crabbed construc-
tion from the start.  In EPA v. Mink,274 the Supreme Court’s first FOIA 
case, the Court found that the Act provided no avenue for members 
of Congress (or anyone else) to require the production of govern-
ment information relating to controversial underground nuclear tests 
the Nixon Administration planned to conduct in Alaska.275  Writing 
for the Court, Justice White acknowledged that FOIA was intended to 
achieve “‘the fullest responsible disclosure,’”276 but went on to hold 
that the judicial role under Exemption 1—the national security and 
foreign affairs exemption—was limited to ascertaining “whether the 
President has determined by Executive Order that particular docu-
ments are to be kept secret.”277  In other words, the Court determined 
that Exemption 1 required the courts to decide whether records actu-
ally had been classified, but not whether they had been properly clas-
sified.278  Although clearly lacking sympathy for the government’s po-
sition, Justice Stewart concurred, believing that Congress’s choice of 
language necessarily dictated the result; he interpreted the statutory 
language as manifesting Congress’s intent to create “an exemption 
[to FOIA] that provides no means to question an Executive decision 
to stamp a document ‘secret,’ however cynical, myopic, or even cor-
rupt that decision might have been,” thereby “decree[ing] blind ac-
ceptance of Executive fiat.”279  Justice Stewart also noted that “a nu-
clear test that engendered fierce controversy within the Executive 
Branch . . . would [seem to] be precisely the kind of event that should 
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be opened to the fullest possible disclosure consistent with legitimate 
interests of national defense.”280  In a separate opinion, Justice Bren-
nan argued that the Court’s decision limited the judicial role to a 
“‘meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion,’ the very re-
sult Congress had sought to prevent.”281 
Congress promptly overruled Mink by enacting an amendment 
that required the courts to determine whether records are in fact 
properly classified pursuant to an executive order, thereby ensuring a 
more muscular form of review.282  But the Court continued to give a 
broad construction to FOIA’s exemptions. 
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Thereafter, the Court would regularly pay lip service to the statu-
tory policy in favor of disclosure, but would seldom again invoke “the 
fullest responsible disclosure” language of the 1965 Senate Report.283  
Moreover, while the Court sometimes would remark on the im-
portance of public access to government information in a representa-
tive government, it typically used such rhetorical flourishes for the 
purpose of embellishing decisions in which it actually held that dis-
closure was not required.  In NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co.,284 
for example, the Court was eloquent: “The basic purpose of FOIA is 
to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a demo-
cratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the 
governors accountable to the governed.”285  But the Court affirmed 
the denial of access to information in that case.286 
The Court also has frequently noted that FOIA exemptions must 
be narrowly construed.  As Justice Scalia observed in dissent in John 
Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,287 however, that decision and others show 
that judicial pronouncements about the narrow construction to be 
given FOIA exemptions are simply “a formula to be recited rather 
than a principle to be followed.”288  More often, the Court speaks in 
terms of two competing statutory policies—transparency and confi-
dentiality—as if the two policies were pari passu.289 
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phrase appears in only three other majority opinions and in one dissent.  See FBI v. Abram-
son, 456 U.S. 615, 641-42 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 
19, 23 (1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 n.12 (1979); Dep’t of Air Force 
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361–62 (1976). 
 284.  437 U.S. 214 (1978).  In Robbins Tire, an employer sought to use FOIA as a means 
of expanding the discovery available to it in connection with agency litigation.  Id. at 216–
17.  Other requesters have often sought to use FOIA to secure some commercial ad-
vantage.  See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 287–88 (upholding refusal to disclose company 
statistics to a third party). 
 285.  Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 242. 
 286.  Id. at 242–43.  These themes were often expressed, more forcefully, in dissents.  
See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188 (Brennan J., dissenting); Abramson, 456 U.S. 
at 641-42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 287.  493 U.S. 146 (1989). 
 288.  Id. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 289.  See, e.g., John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152 (majority opinion) (“Congress sought ‘to 
reach a workable balance between the right of the public to know and the need of the 
Government to keep information in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting 
indiscriminate secrecy.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 6 (1966))); Weinberger v. 
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The Court has narrowly construed the Act in numerous ways.290  
It also has facilitated continued non-disclosure by allowing expansive 
and patently erroneous constructions of FOIA exemptions to stand, 
sometimes for decades, without correction.  For example, in 1966, 
Congress carefully limited Exemption 2 to materials “related solely to 
the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.”291  Congress 
considered the prior formulation—“‘any matter relating solely to the 
internal management of an agency’”—as too broad, too expansive, 
and too subject to abuse.292  In 1981, however, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reconstituted Exemption 2—creating the so-called “High 
2” exemption—to permit the withholding a broader range of materi-
als, including such materials as government law enforcement training 
manuals.293  That innovation—based on an almost inconceivable read-
                                                          
Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (“FOIA was in-
tended by Congress to balance the public’s need for access to official information with the 
Government’s need for confidentiality.”); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980) (“The FOIA represents a carefully balanced scheme of 
public rights and agency obligations designed to foster greater access to agency records 
than existed prior to its enactment.”); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 261 (“The [FOIA] 
has two aspects.  In one, it seeks to open public records to greater public access; in the 
other, it seeks to preserve the confidentiality undeniably essential in certain areas of Gov-
ernment operations.”). 
 290.  See, e.g., Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 153–54 (finding no obligation under FOIA to create 
or retain documents, let alone to retrieve or produce records wrongfully removed from 
agency); Forsham, 445 U.S. at 178-79 (concluding that records created by federal grantees 
are not “agency records”); United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–73 (1989) (determining that the right to disclosure de-
pends upon the requested records being related to FOIA’s “core purpose” of permitting 
and advancing public scrutiny of government); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Fed. La-
bor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994) (same).  In Kissinger, Justice Brennan would have 
found that records were “withheld” where an agency had taken no steps to retrieve a rec-
ord to which it was entitled.  Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  In Department of Defense, Justice Ginsburg correctly noted that the “core 
purpose” test had no textual basis, and that FOIA imposed on requesters no obligation to 
disclose any purpose, let alone to show a “core purpose.” 510 U.S. at 507 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
 291.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970). 
 292.  See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011) (discussing the con-
gressional intent behind Exemption 2). 
 293.  Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1074 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981).  Previously, the D.C. Circuit had taken Exemption 2 to exempt only materials 
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ing of straightforward statutory language—persisted for thirty years.  
In Milner v. Department of the Navy,294 the government persuaded the 
Ninth Circuit that “data and maps used to help store explosives at a 
naval base in Washington State” were materials “‘related solely to the 
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,’” and were there-
fore protected under the “High 2” exemption.295  Although the doc-
uments were not classified, and Exemption 1 was not formally in-
voked, the government made much of the national security context.296  
In Milner, a virtually unanimous Supreme Court rejected the govern-
ment’s argument and finally interred the judicially-crafted “High 2” 
exemption.297 
As Milner shows, the government regularly invokes exemptions 
other than Exemption 1 to withhold records on national security 
grounds.  In many cases, the government cannot invoke Exemption 1 
because the records are not classified.298  Sometimes the government 
will invoke Exemption 3, which permits the withholding of infor-
mation “specifically exempted from disclosure by [a statute which ei-
ther] requires the matters to be withheld from the public in such a 
                                                          
relating to “pay, pensions, vacations, hours of work, lunch hours, parking etc.”  Id. at 1056 
(internal quotations omitted).  The court found justification for its new reading in Depart-
ment of Air Force v. Rose, which disapproved the withholding of Air Force Academy honor 
hearing summaries, but acknowledged that withholding might be justified “where disclo-
sure may risk circumvention of agency regulation.”  425 U.S. 352, 369 (1976).  The D.C. 
Circuit’s understanding of Exemption 2 flowed from FOIA’s “overall design,” its legislative 
history, “and even common sense,” because Congress could not have meant to “enact[] a 
statute whose provisions undermined . . . the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.”  
Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1074. 
 294.  131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011). 
 295.  Id. at 1262 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2006)). 
 296.  Id. at 1271. 
 297.  Id. at 1262–71. 
 298.  On November 4, 2010, however, President Obama signed Executive Order No. 
13,556, which authorizes post-hoc classification.  Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 
68675 (Nov. 4, 2011).  In an earlier Executive Order, President Obama authorized agen-
cies to use a so-called “Glomar response” to answer FOIA requests for records “whenever 
the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order or its prede-
cessors.”  Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 719 (Jan. 5, 2010).  In a Glomar re-
sponse, the government declines to produce the requested records, but neither admits nor 
denies that the records exist.  See Michael D. Becker, Comment, Piercing Glomar: Using the 
Freedom of Information Act and the Official Acknowledgment Doctrine to Keep Government Secrecy in 
Check, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 675–78 (2012). 
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manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” or “establishes particu-
lar criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to 
be withheld.”299  The National Security Act,300 which gives the CIA 
“sweeping power to protect its ‘intelligence sources and methods,’”301 
is an Exemption 3 statute.  The government also invokes other ex-
emptions, such as the law enforcement provisions of Exemption 7, to 
withhold documents on national security grounds.302 
Sometimes, as with the detention photos involved in ACLU v. De-
partment of Defense,303 the government has difficulty locating a justifica-
tion for nondisclosure within the canonical exemptions.  In ACLU, 
the government sought to prevent the disclosure of photographs por-
traying the abuse of prisoners in American custody in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan.304  The government did so on a number of grounds, invok-
ing several distinct FOIA exemptions during the litigation.305  In the 
court of appeals, the government relied principally on an extravagant 
reading of Exemption 7(F) (the endangerment of the life or physical 
safety of any individual exemption),306 which the government did not 
raise until after the case had been briefed, argued, and submitted for 
decision in the district court.307  The government argued that the 
photographs should be withheld from the American public because 
American military personnel could be endangered by the reaction of 
                                                          
 299.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A), (B) (2006). 
 300.  National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 235, 61 Stat. 495. 
 301.  CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168–69 (1985). 
 302.  See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180 (2011) (invoking Exemption 7); Nat’l 
Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160 (2004) (same); NLRB v. Robbins 
Tire and Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 216 (1978) (same); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
421 U.S. 132, 162–63 (1975) (same).  The Obama Administration’s (far from unprece-
dented) selective leaking of information about classified initiatives, such as the govern-
ment’s drone program and use of cyber-attacks, provides context for the government’s at-
tempts to use invocations of national security concerns as a way of bolstering other FOIA 
exemptions.  See Shane, supra note 6 (reporting the selective leaking of drone attacks in 
Pakistan). 
 303.  543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated, Dep’t of Defense v. ACLU, 130 S. Ct. 777 
(2009). 
 304.  Id. at 63. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Exemption 7(F) exempts from mandatory disclosure records the disclosure of 
which “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ-
ual.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2006). 
 307.  ACLU, 543 F.3d at 64. 
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foreign nationals to the publication of the pictures.308  The Second 
Circuit rejected the government’s arguments and declined to hold 
that the photographs were exempt from disclosure.309  In any event, 
the government regularly argues that its precise choice of exemption 
is immaterial, and that whatever exemption it chooses should be put 
on steroids whenever the government can point to some arguable na-
tional security concern. 
The nature of the FOIA litigation process and the evidentiary 
record developed in FOIA cases makes the acceptance of such en-
treaties particularly significant.  Cases involving FOIA do not involve 
extensive discovery or live testimony.  They generally stand or fall on 
affidavits, and much therefore depends on the willingness of a judge 
to engage and interrogate the government’s representations.  The Act 
authorizes, but does not require, judges to review the requested rec-
ords in camera; judges seldom do so.310  The records that are poten-
tially responsive to a FOIA request are often voluminous; a judge 
could do little more than “dip into” them,311 and even then she would 
be required to evaluate their contents without guidance from the re-
                                                          
 308.  Id. at 63.  In other words, the government argued that the American people 
should be precluded from evaluating evidence of crimes committed on their behalf be-
cause our enemies might use the truth against us.  If that reasoning were valid, the gov-
ernment would always be entitled to conceal its very worst behavior from the people, 
which turns the principle of representative democracy on its head.  Sullivan, Methods, supra 
note 52, at 17–18. 
 309.  ACLU, 543 F.3d at 63–64. 
 310.  See Juarez v. Dep’t of Justice, 518 F.3d. 54, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It is true that 
FOIA provides district courts the option to conduct in camera review . . . but it by no means 
compels the exercise of that option.”).  In Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 
824 (D.C. Cir. 1979), NSA denied possession of any responsive materials, but parallel State 
Department and CIA requests showed that NSA actually did have such materials.  Id. at 
825.  The district court granted summary judgment for NSA, but the appellate court re-
versed, citing the inadequacy of NSA’s affidavit: “Barren assertions that an exempting stat-
ute has been met cannot suffice to establish that fact, yet one will search the Boardman 
affidavit in vain for anything more.”  Id. at 825, 831 (footnote omitted).  The court further 
noted “[t]he importance of maximizing adversary procedures in suits such as this,” be-
cause “the parties and the court, if sufficiently informed, may discern a means of liberating 
withheld documents without compromising the agency’s legitimate interests.”  Id. at 832–
33.  Subsequent jurisprudence contemplates a far less active role for requestors and the 
courts. 
 311.  See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 17 (1938) (“The bulky record was placed 
upon [the Secretary’s] desk and he dipped into it from time to time to get its drift.”). 
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questor.312  Moreover, strong appellate admonitions against in camera 
review further discourage courts from conducting such a review.313  
Appellate courts may be concerned that a more searching review 
would sometimes contribute to judicial mistakes that would harm our 
national interests, but reviewing courts sit to correct such mistakes.  In 
addition, Congress can always adopt a legislative solution, as it did 
when it promptly overturned the Second Circuit’s ACLU decision.314  
Indeed, the process that Congress used to overturn that decision is it-
self remarkable.  With virtually no debate, Congress created a specific 
exemption for the pictures at issue, presumably because the possible 
reaction in foreign countries to these photographic records of mis-
conduct by U.S. military personnel justified the withholding from the 
American people of the apparently damning evidence.315 
The courts also will be constrained by the so-called “mosaic” the-
ory, which posits that judges should defer to expert government 
judgments because enemies of the United States are able to connect 
seemingly innocuous bits of information in ways that will not be obvi-
ous to judges.316  Finally, affidavits necessarily will contain expert pre-
                                                          
 312.  In Juarez, which was not a national security case, the court upheld a summary 
judgment for the government based on Exemption 7(A) because the DEA’s affidavits con-
firmed the existence of an ongoing investigation and averred that “the release of any por-
tion of the withheld documents would compromise the investigation as it could lead to 
destruction of evidence and disclosure of potential witnesses’ identities as well as DEA’s 
investigative techniques.”  Juarez, 518 F.3d at 58.  The district court granted the motion 
without an in camera review of the records—which consisted of only fifteen pages—and 
the court declined to give any explanation for failing to conduct such a review.  Id. at 59–
60.  In addition, the district court failed to make any determination concerning segregabil-
ity, which technically constituted reversible error.  Id. at 60–61.  The appellate court also 
declined to inspect the fifteen-page record, but held that reversal was unnecessary.  Id. 
 313.  See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Although 
district courts possess broad discretion regarding whether to conduct in camera review, . . . 
we have made clear that ‘[w]hen the agency meets its burden . . . in camera review is nei-
ther necessary nor appropriate.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 314.  Sullivan, Methods, supra note 52, at 18–19. 
 315.  See id. at 19 (describing the legislative process involved).  In recent years, Congress 
has also enacted legislation to protect critical infrastructure materials from disclosure. See 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 2012). 
 316.  See David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 632 (2005) (arguing that affording additional judicial def-
erence to agencies is a practice contrary to FOIA); see also Liz Heffernan, Evidence and Na-
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dictions, rather than simple recitations of historical fact; they may ad-
dress matters such as the likely reaction in other countries to evidence 
of American misconduct, including the mistreatment of enemy com-
batants or other detainees.  In such circumstances, the government 
will contend that records should be withheld from the American peo-
ple because they could be used for propaganda purposes or to incite 
violence against American personnel by America’s enemies.317  As Jus-
tice Stewart said about the nuclear test reports at issue in Mink, how-
ever, this is precisely the kind of information that ought to be the sub-
ject of robust public debate in a representative democracy.318 
The District of Columbia Circuit has long accepted the govern-
ment’s argument that, regardless of the precise exemption invoked, 
extraordinary deference should be paid to decisions about withhold-
ing information that bear some relationship to national security.319  In 
ACLU, for example, the court observed that the government’s burden 
in such cases is “a light one.”320  The court also noted: “‘[I]n the FOIA 
                                                          
tional Security: Belief Evidence Before the Irish Special Criminal Court, 15 EUR. PUB. L. 65, 76–77 
(2009) (describing deference afforded under Irish practice). 
 317.  See Sullivan, Methods, supra note 52, at 17–19 (discussing litigation and legislation 
concerning enemy combatant photos). 
 318.  EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 94–95 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Houchins v. KQED, 
438 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that citizens are ultimately 
responsible for prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners in a democratic society 
and are entitled to be well-informed about them).  Presumably, the government would 
have withheld the recently published photos of U.S. Marines urinating on the bodies of 
enemy fighters in Afghanistan, if it had been able to do so, based on their potential propa-
ganda value.  But propaganda value often is related to truly deplorable behavior, which 
the people have a responsibility—as well as a right—to know about.  See Graham Bowley & 
Matthew Rosenberg, Video Inflames A Delicate Moment for U.S. in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 2012, at A4 (reporting on an incident in which a group of United States Marines uri-
nated on dead Taliban soldiers). 
 319.  Legislative history indicates that courts should “accord substantial weight to an 
agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record” un-
der Exemption 1, H.R.  REP. NO. 93-1380, at 12 (1974), but it is unclear precisely what 
“substantial weight” means, particularly because the legislative history also emphasizes that 
the courts are not to “defer to the discretion of the agency, even if it finds the determina-
tion not arbitrary or capricious.”  S. REP. NO. 93-854, at 16 (1974).  The D.C. Circuit has 
extended this analysis to Exemption 3, but the Supreme Court has not yet done so.  See 
Hayden v. NSA/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (giving substantial 
weight to agency affidavits). 
 320.  ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 624 (2011). 
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context, we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predict-
ing harm to national security, and have found it unwise to undertake 
searching judicial review.’”321  Thus, “[t]he CIA’s arguments need on-
ly be both ‘plausible’ and ‘logical’ to justify the invocation of a FOIA 
exemption in the national security context.”322 
Exactly what the court meant by “defer[ring] to executive affida-
vits” is not clear.  Nor is it clear how searching the review must be be-
fore such searching becomes unwise.  Many opinions add little be-
cause they provide only excerpts from affidavits, making it difficult to 
ascertain the full scope and flavor of the submissions; only rarely is an 
affidavit set out in full.323  It is sobering, however, to see how little the 
government sometimes thinks is necessary to include in affidavits, as 
demonstrated by the declaration submitted in the indefinite deten-
tion case of Yaser Hamdi.324  In that case, of course, the conclusory af-
fidavit was not offered simply in opposition to a request for govern-
ment information, but in support of the government’s contention 
that it had the absolute power to incarcerate a suspected young ter-
rorist indefinitely, perhaps for his entire life, without the possibility of 
independent review of the reasons presumably supporting his contin-
ued incarceration.  In any event, the burden is indeed light if an affi-
davit need only be plausible and logical.  Affidavits can be highly 
plausible and highly logical, while bearing little relationship to reality. 
When Congress amended Exemption 1 in 1974—specifically because 
the Mink Court eschewed any need for “searching” review—it clearly 
                                                          
 321.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 
331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 322.   Id.  Moreover, in Larson v. Department of State, the court emphasized that in camera 
inspection is a matter of “last resort” in “national security situations” and cannot be justi-
fied on the ground that “it can’t hurt.”  565 F.3d 857, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 323.  Occasionally, the courts have set out an affidavit in its entirety, usually in cases in 
which the affidavit was found to be inadequate.  See, e.g., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 
1198–99 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 324.  Declaration of Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of State, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439 (E.D. Va.), dated July 24, 2002, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/tools/mobbshamdi.html.  In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit held: 
[N]o evidentiary hearing or factual inquiry on our part is necessary or proper, 
because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat op-
erations in a foreign country and because any inquiry must be circumscribed to 
avoid encroachment into the military affairs entrusted to the executive branch. 
316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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intended a more muscular form of judicial review.325  Otherwise, the 
1974 Senate Report would not have insisted that courts should not 
“defer to the discretion of the agency, even if [they find] the deter-
mination not arbitrary or capricious.”326 
The D.C. Circuit’s approach is exemplified by Center for National 
Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice,327 which upheld the with-
holding of records relating to the detention of hundreds of persons 
of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks.328  Even the names of the detainees’ lawyers were found to be 
exempt from disclosure.329  The panel majority asserted that the 
courts should not second-guess the executive.330  A rare dissent, how-
ever, observed that “the court’s uncritical deference to the govern-
ment’s vague, poorly explained arguments for withholding broad cat-
egories of information . . . as well as its willingness to fill in the factual 
and logical gaps in the government’s case, eviscerates both FOIA itself 
and the principles of openness in government that FOIA embod-
ies.”331  What the majority saw as appropriate deference to executive 
authority the dissent saw as a total abdication of judicial responsibil-
ity.332 
                                                          
 325.  Moreover, Congress authorized that searching review with respect to records that 
the executive had actually classified, not simply those that it wanted to keep secret for less 
compelling reasons. 
 326.  S. REP. NO. 93-854, at 16 (1974). 
 327.  331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 328.  Id. at 920–21, 925–32. 
 329.  Id. at 932–33. 
 330.  Id. at 928. 
 331.  Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 332.  Id. at 951–52.  The question of deference to conclusory government affidavits also 
arose in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).  In that case, certain 
U.S. citizens and domestic organizations challenged the constitutionality of a criminal 
statute that makes it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources 
to a foreign terrorist organization.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).  In part, the dispute involved 
the question whether the plaintiffs were providing “material support or resources” by en-
gaging in otherwise lawful activities that benefited these groups.  The government’s posi-
tion was that by providing even clearly lawful services, such as advocacy training, the plain-
tiffs would be aiding terrorism by freeing up other resources that could be used to support 
terrorist activities.  In support of that theory, the government presented an affidavit stating 
that “it is highly likely that any material support of these organizations will ultimately inure 
to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions—regardless of whether such support 
was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist activities.”  Id. at 2727 (quot-
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The plausible and logical test effectively asks judges to approach 
the government’s affidavits with an exceptionally strong, and perhaps 
irrebuttable, presumption of correctness, not with the critical eye that 
judges normally are expected to bring to fact-finding.  Other tests, 
however, are available.  For example, in Attaran v. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs,333 a Canadian federal court recently required the government 
“to satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities through clear and 
direct evidence that there will be a reasonable expectation of proba-
ble harm from disclosure of specific information” and to provide 
“specific detailed evidence” showing that “confidentiality [was] justi-
fied . . . and [not simply the result of] an overly cautious approach.”334 
Current jurisprudence tells judges that they must affirm a denial 
of disclosure whenever it is supported by an affidavit that is logical 
and plausible, but nothing more.  In addition, current jurisprudence 
tells judges that they should not risk confusing themselves with the 
facts by inspecting the requested records.  These instructions only 
serve to confirm the conviction that access to government infor-
                                                          
ing affidavit).  In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the majority held that such 
factual evaluations by the Executive were entitled to deference.  Id.  Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Roberts denied that such deference constituted abdication of judicial respon-
sibility and emphasized that “[i]n this context, conclusions must often be based on in-
formed judgment rather than concrete evidence, and that reality affects what we may rea-
sonably insist on from the Government.”  Id. at 2728.  On the other hand, Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion concluded with the observation: 
[T]he Court has failed to examine the Government’s justifications with sufficient 
care.  It has failed to insist upon specific evidence, rather than general assertion.  
It has failed to require tailoring of means to fit compelling ends.  And ultimately 
it deprives the individuals before us of the protection that the First Amendment 
demands. 
Id. at 2743 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 333.  [2009] F.C.R. 399 (Can.), rev’d, [2011] 4 F.C.R D-1. 
 334.  Id. ¶ 43 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Another Canadian 
case elaborates on the test: 
Judges working under the process have eschewed an overly deferential approach, 
insisting instead on a searching examination of the reasonableness of the certifi-
cate on the material placed before them . . . .  They are correct to do so, having 
regard to the language of the provision, the history of its adoption, and the role 
of the designated judge. 
Charkaoui v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2007] I S.C.R. 350, ¶ 38 (Can.).  
But see Heffernan, supra note 318, at 76–77 (describing deference afforded under Irish 
practice). 
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mation is merely a political matter, rather than a legal one, and the 
belief that any mention of foreign affairs or national security, however 
fanciful or unsupported by fact, justifies the creation of a judicial “no-
fly-zone.”  A better approach was suggested by Justice Stevens at his 
1975 Senate confirmation hearing.  Senator Mathias asked then-
Seventh Circuit Judge Stevens about the proper judicial attitude to-
ward assertions that national security considerations permitted the 
government to undertake actions that would otherwise violate the 
law.335  Then-Judge Stevens replied: “I would think that one who relies 
on national security as a justification for action that otherwise would 
be impermissible bears a very heavy burden,” that is, “the burden is 
on the Government . . . to show that this is a valid reason and to be 
prepared to make such a demonstration.”336 
What is missing from current law is a genuine commitment to the 
people’s “right to know,” a right embedded in the First Amendment 
and realized by Congress in FOIA as a vehicle to ensure that the peo-
ple would have the “fullest responsible disclosure” of government 
records.  A statute based on such fundamental considerations relating 
to the very nature of our system of self-government deserves respect 
from each of the branches of government; and it requires each of the 
branches to be mindful of those considerations in their encounters 
with the statute.  Courts, by accepting the sufficiency of vague and 
conclusory affidavits to justify the withholding of information from 
the public, do not manifest that necessary respect.  Nor does Congress 
when it overturns judicial decisions requiring disclosure with no men-
tion of the public’s “right to know” and no real debate about whether 
curtailment of that right is justifiable under the circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Freedom of Information Act recognizes that citizens need 
information to fulfill their responsibilities as citizens.337  At the pre-
sent time, when political leaders can commit the nation to costly wars 
of choice, with little public debate or discussion, in aid of a seemingly 
endless war on terror, the citizen’s need for information is as compel-
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ling as it ever has been.338  But the promise of FOIA remains unful-
filled, particularly when national security considerations can be inter-
posed as plausible objections to disclosure, no matter how transient, 
ephemeral, or remote the danger to national security may be.339 
Government officials routinely produce vague and conclusory af-
fidavits to justify the withholding of information, and courts routinely 
find those affidavits sufficient to justify the withholding.340  Courts do 
not focus on FOIA’s constitutional parentage, let alone on the cen-
trality of a well-informed public to the project of representative de-
mocracy; they choose instead to justify their decisions in terms of def-
erence to the political branches.341  But the political branches also 
show little respect for the legitimacy of the people’s right to know.342 
Judicial performance in this vital area leaves much to be desired.  
It is tempting to conclude that “judges care mostly about their formal 
place in legal order,” and that, “[a]s long as they get to wield the final 
stamp of approval, they do not mind validating arbitrariness.”343  Until 
courts engage in a more searching form of review with respect to the 
government’s representations, there will be no reason to resist that 
temptation. 
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